COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS by Solomon, Lewis D. & Asaro, Tricia
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 24 | Number 2 Article 2
1997
COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE: A
LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Lewis D. Solomon
Tricia Asaro
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lewis D. Solomon and Tricia Asaro, COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS , 24 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 235 (1997).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol24/iss2/2
COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE: A LEGAL AND POLICY
ANALYSIS
Cover Page Footnote
Dwayne Eichenbaum, Erica Watkins, Sarah P. Windle; students at the George Washington University Law
School; Leonard E. Klein, Research librarian; The George Washington Law School; Congressman Bob Filner
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol24/iss2/2
COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE: A
LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Lewis D. Solomon* and Tricia Asaro**
Introduction
As we approach the next millennium, the United States' health
care system is in turmoil. A major federal effort to reform our
health care system failed; only modest federal incremental reforms
were enacted in 1996.
While Washington has been unable to lead the way in significant
health care reform, the health care system has begun to transform
itself in terms of curbing skyrocketing health care costs, dealing
with the more than forty million Americans who lack health care
coverage, and the problems plaguing the Medicare and Medicaid
systems. Clearly, hospitals, physicians, health plans, and purchas-
ers of health care have begun to search for a health care model that
ensures quality care to a wide population in a cost-efficient
manner.
This article explores how the U.S. health care system currently
functions, examines several innovative models, and suggests ways
in which a decentralized, community-based approach to health care
reform can address our nation's health care crisis. Specifically,
Part I examines the current system of health care financing. Part II
discusses current efforts to provide community based care. Part III
offers suggestions for a community-based approach to health care
reform, including ways to stimulate provider volunteerism, financ-
ing mechanisms, and methods to overcome potential legal barriers
to local reform efforts.
* Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
** Third Year Student, The George Washington University Law School. The au-
thors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Dwayne Eichenbaum, Erica
Watkins, and Sarah P. Windle, students at The George Washington University Law
School, as well as Leonard E. Klein, Research Librarian, The George Washington
University Law School. We wish to thank Congressman Bob Filner (D-Ca) for bring-
ing the San Diego County Medical Program to our attention.
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I. Current Structure for Financing Health Care
Introduction
Health insurance in the United States is obtained through a com-
bination of private initiatives and public programs. Medicare pro-
vides health insurance for approximately 32 million people aged
sixty-five or older.' Medicaid provides health insurance for ap-
proximately 32.1 million poor U.S. residents.2 There are several
other government insurance programs that provide health care
coverage to millions of Americans (e.g., Defense Department in-
surance for active-duty military personnel, Veterans Administra-
tion health insurance for veterans and military retirees, Indian
Health Service for Native Americans living on Indian Reserva-
tions, and Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS) for military dependents).3 Most of the re-
maining U.S. population purchases health insurance on the private
market. An estimated 40 million U.S. citizens and legal residents,
however, do not have health insurance.4
Beginning in the 1980s, the number of Americans lacking ade-
quate health insurance increased steadily as health care costs rose
several times faster than inflation. In 1993, the United States spent
13.9% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health care.'
Without major reforms of the health care system, health care is
expected to consume 14.1% of GDP in 1995, and 18.0% by 2005.6
This rapid increase in health care costs is a major factor in the
growth of the number of uninsured, and if costs continue to esca-
late unchecked, the number of Americans without insurance will
continue to grow.
1. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND,
1995 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
2. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID FACTS 1
(1995).
3. Interview with Steven A. Kroll, Director of Federal Relations Healthcare As-
sociation of New York State, in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1995).
4. The Employer Group Purchasing Reform Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 1062
Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (prepared testimony of Mark V. Nadel, Assoc. Director, National and Public
Health Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, General Accounting
Office).
5. Richard Price and Richard Rimkunas, Health Care Fact Sheet: 1993 National
Health Spending 1 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. 94-952,
Dec. 1,1994).
6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK:
AN UPDATE 83 (1995).
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Private Insurance
Before the 1930s, few health insurance plans existed. Most
Americans paid for their medical expenses out-of-pocket, either
with cash or bartered goods. Hospitals, which were originally simi-
lar to poorhouses, filled in the gaps by providing care to those who
could not afford to pay for medical services.7 During the Great
Depression, Americans were increasingly unable to afford to pay
for medical services out-of-pocket. At the same time, hospitals,
which had relied on charitable funding to operate, faced insolvency
as revenues dissipated.8 In response, several hospitals developed
health plans designed to provide a more predictable flow of reve-
nue. Under these plans, patients who made a periodic pre-deter-
mined payment to the hospital received hospital services.
Eventually, groups of hospitals banded together to form multiple
hospital plans. 9
Blue Cross
Building upon the experiences of multiple hospital plans, Blue
Cross established its first plan in Dallas, Texas in 1929.10 The plan
negotiated payment rates with participating hospitals that agreed
to provide selected services to subscribers. Blue Cross spread
health care costs among subscribers by charging a single, commu-
nity-wide premium based on expected costs for all policyholders
("community rating")."' Low-cost individuals or groups (e.g.,
young, healthy individuals) helped to pay for participants requiring
more extensive hospitalization services.
Blue Cross plans assumed responsibility for serving the entire
community and for providing insurance to low-income and moder-
ate-income persons. Under Blue Cross's open enrollment policy,
any individual or group could purchase insurance regardless of
their health status. In exchange for providing coverage to all seg-
ments of the population, Blue Cross plans were tax exempt and
were relieved from meeting certain requirements established by
state insurance commissions.12
7. SYLVIA A. LAW ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 10 (1995).
8. Id. at 12-13, 17.
9. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNIN-
SURED: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS 15 (1988).
10. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASSOCIATION, FACT BOOK: ALL ABOUT THE
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD ORGANIZATION 2 (1996).
11. LAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 20.
12. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 15-16.
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Commercial Insurers
While Blue Cross plans expanded their coverage throughout the
United States, commercial insurers began to offer health insurance.
Commercial insurers first offered employers and other groups "in-
demnity coverage" against hospital expenses.' 3 Under this type of
coverage, the insurer paid the enrollee directly for hospital services
used. The enrollee, in turn, paid the provider and assumed respon-
sibility for any provider charges that exceeded the insurer's
payment.
By the late 1930s, many commercial insurers expanded their pol-
icies to cover surgery and other physician services delivered in the
hospital setting. This type of coverage was commonly called "com-
prehensive insurance." Enrollees usually bore responsibility for a
portion of the costs of these services under a cost-sharing arrange-
ment.14 As health care delivery became more sophisticated, some
insurers also offered "major medical" plans that covered other
medical expenses such as prescription drugs, rehabilitation care,
and physician office visits. 15
Commercial insurers differed from Blue Cross in significant
ways. Unlike Blue Cross, commercial insurers employed experi-
ence rating under which the premium rate for each employer group
was based on historic costs for that specific group.16 Commercial
insurers also adopted underwriting practices comparable to those
traditionally used in other lines of the insurance business. Appli-
cants perceived to be high risk might be charged higher premiums,
or be denied coverage for problems already diagnosed at the time
the health policy took effect under an exclusion of pre-existing con-
ditions. Applicants with costly chronic conditions generally would
be denied coverage altogether or charged extremely high
premiums.1 7
Blue Shield
As noted earlier, commercial insurers offered coverage not only
for hospital services but also for surgery, physician office visits, and
other health care services. To compete with these comprehensive
health insurance plans, Blue Shield was established. A counterpart
to Blue Cross, Blue Shield provided insurance coverage for physi-
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 15 (1994).
17. Id. at 16.
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cian services. Blue Shield reimbursed physicians for the full cost of
services, based on a negotiated schedule. Like Blue Cross, Blue
Shield employed community rating.18
Group-Practice Associations
In addition to the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and commercial
insurers, group-practice associations, the forerunners of today's
managed-care plans, evolved. 19 A group-practice association con-
sisted of several physicians who joined forces and contracted to
furnish care to an enrolled population for a pre-arranged fee.
Group-practice associations were often established to serve specific
employers, especially large industrial corporations that built and
administered communities for their employees and their families.
Health Insurance's Evolving Role
By the Second World War, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans domi-
nated the health insurance market.20 However, the industry was
still in its infancy and insurance covered only a small percentage of
the population. New economic policies implemented during the
war, however, facilitated the growth of employer-based health in-
surance programs. Wartime price stabilization resulted in capped
wages. Barred from offering workers higher wages, employers
competed for the best employees by offering packages of noncash
benefits. Health insurance served as an attractive benefit because
employer's contributions were not subject to federal income
taxes.2'
After World War II, when the pool of available workers in-
creased with the downsizing of the U.S. military, health care bene-
fits remained a valuable negotiating tool in the labor force. This
was bolstered by the growth of the labor union movement.22 Com-
mercial insurers fared quite well during the post-war period. First,
commercial insurers began to employ more sophisticated market-
ing techniques. Second, they generally offered health insurance
plans at more competitive prices than the Blues. Premiums for
commercial insurance plans were cheaper than Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans because commercial insurers used experience rating.
Instead of computing one premium on the basis of the entire com-
18. Id. at 14.
19. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 16.
20. LAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 8-11
21. HALL, supra note 16, at 14.
22. LAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12.
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munity, commercial insurers offered low premiums to employers
with relatively healthy, low risk groups of employees. 23 This prac-
tice is known as "cherry picking."
Over the years, competition and cost increases have transformed
both commercial insurers and the Blues, with the for-profit com-
mercial insurers adapting more quickly, and the not-for-profit
Blues plans often lagging behind. During the transition, many dif-
ferent health insurance models have developed and supersededthe
previously dominant fee-for-service type of health insurance plans.
Most prevalent has been the development of new models designed
to deal with rising costs.
Current Health Insurance Models
Today there are three basic health insurance models: (1) fee-for-
service (FFS); (2) preferred provider organizations (PPO); and
(3)health maintenance organizations (HMO). In addition, the
evolving insurance market has created many off-shoots and hybrids
of each model.24
FFS or traditional indemnity plans are increasingly rare. In a
traditional indemnity plan, a provider receives a fee for each ser-
vice delivered. Under this model, providers do not share the finan-
cial risk for the cost of medical treatment and health care plans
have little control over provider behavior. Therefore, providers do
not have the financial incentives to deliver services in the most effi-
cient and cost-effective manner.
To restrain providers and control costs, most indemnity insurers
have adopted some management of care techniques to oversee en-
rollees' use of services.25 The large majority of indemnity plans
now have utilization review programs and patient management
programs through which they limit or control access to certain
services or providers. 26 In addition, some FFS plans have estab-
23. HALL, supra note 16, at 14.
24. It is important to note the difference between health plans that use manage-
ment of care techniques and managed care organizations. In the former, the insur-
ance mechanism is completely separate from the provision of care, while in the latter
there is often a blurring of the line between the insurer and the provider. Managed
care organizations include PPOs and HMOs.
25. Memorandum from Sandra Christensen to the Health Staff of the Congres-
sional Budget Office regarding Managed Care and the Medicare Program 2-3 (Apr.
26, 1995) (on file with author).
26. These programs include: prior authorization for certain services (especially for
non-emergency hospital admissions); use of gatekeepers (i.e., a primary care physician
who assumes responsibility for, reviews, and approves all medical care the patient
receives, including care from specialists); concurrent review of hospital use to ensure
240
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lished networks of preferred providers. Often these providers ac-
cept some of the plan's medical oversight and cost containment
measures, and patients who use these preferred providers enjoy re-
duced cost-sharing requirements.27
A PPO represents a risk-bearing managed care plan that inte-
grates the health care financing function with the health care deliv-
ery system. In exchange for a premium payment, the plan agrees
to provide enrollees with any covered medical service they may
require during the period, but enrollees must choose from a limited
list of providers over whom the PPO has considerable oversight.
The insurer remains at risk for the costs of its enrollees' care.
However, the PPO shares this risk with the providers who treat the
enrollees.28 The providers typically agree to accept some financial
risk for the patient in the form of reduced or negotiated prices.
Providers usually participate in many different PPOs simultane-
ously and remain independent businesses (i.e., independent medi-
cal practices or hospitals).
An HMO is a risk-bearing managed care plan which further inte-
grates health care financing and health care delivery. HMOs often
pay providers on a capitated, or other fixed payment basis, for the
patients they treat.2 9 Providers are not paid for each office visit.
Instead they are paid for all the treatment an individual requires
(whether used or not) during a defined time period. The providers
then bear a substantial financial risk since the link between services
provided and payment is severed. Providers who share this level of
risk have a financial stake in controlling utilization, avoiding un-
necessary services, keeping hospital stays short, and keeping pa-
tients healthy by providing preventive care services.30
There are several types of HMOs, from the least integrated and
controlled model (an "independent practice association") to the
most integrated and controlled model (a "staff model"). An in-
the patient's discharge to a less-intensive setting as soon as medically and financially
appropriate; mandatory second opinions; case management for catastrophic illnesses
and injuries; use of medical practice parameters or critical pathways to assist physi-
cians in determining the appropriate course of action; and use of physician practice
profiles to identify those with the most appropriate and inappropriate treatment pat-
terns. Id.
27. Id.
28. PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 26 (1995).
29. James R. Knickman and Kenneth E. Thorpe, Financing for Health Care, in
JONAS'S HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 267, 279 (Anthony R.
Kovner ed., 5th ed. 1995).
30. See PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK (2d
ed. 1993).
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dependent practice association (IPA) contracts with a number of
separate physician practices and hospitals to provide care for the
HMO's patients. Each HMO enrollee must choose, or is assigned,
a physician. The physicians remain in their independent practices
and may treat other patients along with the IPA's enrollees. As
part of their contract with the plan, the physicians are subject to
the plan's oversight when treating IPA patients.3' The group
model HMO contracts with a group of physicians and other health
care providers who serve only the HMO's enrollees. The HMO
has complete oversight over these physicians' entire practice. 32 Fi-
nally, the staff model HMO fully integrates physicians and health
care providers into the health care plan as salaried employees who
practice medicine according to plan standards and protocols.33
Staff model HMOs often provide health care facilities and it is not
uncommon for staff model HMOs to have an exclusive arrange-
ment or ownership interest in hospitals and other residential care
facilities.
HMOs may be for-profit or not-for-profit. Although many of
the original giants that still dominate the market are not-for-profit
(e.g., Kaiser Permanente), for-profit HMOs currently represent the
fastest growing segment in managed care.34
HMOs, PPOs and other managed care organizations employ a
variety of techniques to control costs and to manage patient care.
Most require extensive utilization review programs and patient
management programs. They often offer services in one location
to reduce overhead costs. Integrated, electronic patient records
are standard. Practitioner behavior is closely monitored and con-
trolled. For example, in-plan providers may be required to attend
continuing education programs and to comply with education and
treatment protocols. Cash bonuses reward appropriate provider
behavior, and fee reductions punish inappropriate behavior. While
IPAs generally allow patients to self-refer to in-plan specialists,
most group and staff HMOs restrict access to specialists by requir-
ing a referral from a patient's primary care physician who serves as
a gatekeeper.
31. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 28, at 32.
32. Id. at 31.
33. Id. at 30.
34. Erik Eckholm, While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al, A34.
35. Christensen, supra note 25, at 2.
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In recent years, some managed care plans have begun to offer an
open-ended or point of service (POS) option to its enrollees. This
alternative allows members to use out-of-plan providers for any pa-
tient encounter but subjects them to a substantial cost sharing. Be-
cause it does not completely restrict patient choice, POS is an
attractive option and currently represents the fastest growing man-
aged care option.36
As previously noted, health insurance choices range from the to-
tally unrestricted FFS to the highly controlled staff model HMO.
This range of choices corresponds to a range of costs for health
care services. Generally speaking, the ability of an insurance plan
to control costs is directly proportional to its ability to control pro-
vider and patient behavior. For equal benefit coverage, an FFS
plan generally costs more than an HMO. An HMO has the ability
to strictly control the use of resources, something not possible in
the FFS environment. POS options generally increase costs be-
cause patients can go out of network to receive treatment.37
Many larger employers have forgone the various types of health
plans now available and have chosen to self-insure.38 These em-
ployers cover the costs of their employees' health care directly.
Often, self-insured firms contract with an insurer to serve as a
third-party administrator managing the program for a fee and pay-
ing claims from employer funds.
Federal Health Insurance Programs
As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress
established the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicare is a
health insurance program for the elderly and the disabled. Medi-
caid is a medical assistance program for needy individuals. To-
gether these programs help pay for health care for more than 65
million Americans.39
Medicare
Medicare is the federal entitlement program, created by Title
XVIII-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, a 1965
amendment to the Social Security Act,40 providing health insur-
36. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 28, at 28.
37. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MEMORANDUM: THE EFFECTS OF
MANAGED CARE AND MANAGED COMPETITION 7 (1995).
38. HALL, supra note 16, at 25.
39. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ddd (1994).
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ance benefits to persons over the age of 65 and to others eligible
for Social Security benefits. The program consists of two sub-pro-
grams, known as Part A and Part B.
Medicare Part A, the Hospital Insurance Program, automatically
enrolls all persons at age sixty-five if they are entitled to benefits
under the Old Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance
Program or the Federal Railroad Retirement Program. 41 In addi-
tion, Part A covers persons under 65 who have been eligible for
disability for more than two years42 and insured workers (and their
dependents) requiring renal dialysis or kidney transplants.43
Medicare Part A provides coverage for in-patient hospital serv-
ices, up to 100 days of post hospital skilled nursing facility (SNF)
care, hospice care, and home health services. 44 Beneficiaries must
pay certain cost-sharing charges. In 1996, the deductible for in-pa-
tient hospital care was $736 per benefit period.45 A benefit period
is defined as the period beginning when a patient enters a hospital
and ending when she has not been in a hospital or SNF for sixty
days.4 6 Patients requiring SNF care are subject to daily coinsur-
ance charges for the twenty-first through one hundredth day.47 In
1996, that charge was $92.00.48 Although there are limited charges
for hospice care, no charges are imposed for "services furnished to
such individual which constitute hospice care, regardless of the set-
ting in which such services are furnished. '49
The Hospital Insurance Trust Fund finances Medicare Part A.50
All working Americans and their employers pay a payroll tax that
is deducted directly from paychecks and deposited into this trust
fund. Employers and employees each contribute 1.45% of annual
taxable earnings; self-employed workers contribute 2.90% of their
taxable earnings."
Medicare Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance Pro-
gram, 2 represents the voluntary portion of Medicare that provides
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1994).
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr (1994).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1994).
45. 60 Fed. Reg. 53,625 (1995).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e(a)(3) (1994).
48. 60 Fed. Reg. 53,625 (1995).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(e) (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(h) (1994).
51. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND,
supra note 1, at 1.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w-4 (1994).
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coverage for physician services, laboratory services, durable medi-
cal equipment, outpatient hospital services, and other medical serv-
ices.53 All persons entitled to Part A, the Hospital Insurance
Program, are eligible for Part B. Upon enrollment, Part B benefi-
ciaries receive supplementary medical insurance in exchange for
monthly premiums.5 4 General government revenues and premi-
ums paid by beneficiaries finance Medicare Part B. In 1996, both
aged and disabled beneficiaries pay a monthly premium of
$42.50. 55 Medicaid pays the Part B premium for many low-income
elderly. General tax revenues pay the remaining program costs.
Medicare's costs now top $150 billion per year. They are in-
creasing at an approximate rate of 10.5% annually. 6 Within seven
years, experts predict that Medicare will exhaust its trust fund for
Part A payments. 57 As the number of elderly drawing benefits in-
creases, and the average lifetime benefit per beneficiary rises, and
the number of workers supporting the trust fund decreases, the
trust fund's future seems increasingly threatened. According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Medicare must realize sav-
ings of $165 billion over the next seven years to remain solvent.58
The impending crisis has sparked intense debate about how to
provide quality care to the elderly at lower costs. Policy makers
face the following options: (1) cutting payments to providers; (2)
raising costs to beneficiaries; (3) enrolling beneficiaries into man-
aged care plans, or (4) raising the Medicare tax or other taxes.59
Cutting payments to providers, although politically viable, could
jeopardize some essential and already vulnerable providers. 60 For
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1994).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r (1994).
55. 60 Fed. Reg. 53,625 (1995).
56. George Anders and Laurie McGinley, Managed Eldercare: HMOs Are Signing
Up New Class of Member: The Group in Medicare, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
57. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND,
supra note 1, at 3.
58. Milt Freudenheim, Medicare, Jot This Down: Employers Offer Valuable Les-
sons On Saving Money With Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at D1.
59. In addition, efforts to stamp out fraud and abuse and to increase program
efficiencies will bolster the trust fund. The Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has several
offices charged with detecting fraud and abuse, developing innovative models for de-
livery of care to beneficiaries, evaluating medical technology, and developing medical
practice guidelines. Medicare's administrative budget is approximately 2% of pro-
gram costs, much less than the overhead of commercial insurers which often exceed
10%. Interview with Steven A. Kroll, Director of Federal Relations Healthcare Asso-
ciation of New York State, in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1995).
60. Id.
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example, many hospitals in inner-city and rural areas currently op-
erate at a loss. Excessively burdensome cuts could force these
providers to close. 61 Raising costs to beneficiaries is politically un-
popular, as is increasing Medicare or other taxes.
Managed care is increasingly viewed as an important component
of any effort to restore the Medicare Trust Fund and rein in the
cost of this federal program.62 Many lawmakers and some health
policy experts view HMOs and other managed care plans as the
most effective way to reduce the rate at which health care costs for
those over 65 increases. Noting that the private sector has slowed
health care costs in part by adopting managed care techniques, ad-
vocates argue that billions of dollars could be saved each year if
senior citizens were encouraged to enroll in managed care pro-
grams.63 However, the amount saved by managed care plans di-
rectly relates to the level of control exerted over the insured.64 In
the current political environment, it may be difficult for the federal
government to limit the health care choices of the elderly. More-
over, managed care organizations owe much of their success to
their efforts in keeping people healthy. But elderly persons are
more likely to get sick and need medical care regardless of preven-
tive efforts. Thus, it is unclear whether Medicare could achieve ex-
tensive savings by expanding managed care programs. In fact,
studies by the Congressional Budget Office and General Account-
ing Office indicate that the cost savings from Medicare managed
care could be illusory. 65
Currently, Medicare enrolls approximately 9% of its benefi-
ciaries in managed care plans.66 Of these, 7% are in Medicare risk
contracts that accept a fixed payment to treat beneficiaries and 2%
are enrolled in HMOs that have opted to participate in Medicare
but receive payment on a cost-of-treatment basis.67
The remaining 91% of Medicare enrollees are in Medicare's fee-
for-service sector, which utilizes limited management-of-care tech-
61. Id.
62. Id. For instance, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, passed by Congress and
vetoed by the President, would have expanded Medicare managed care significantly.
63. Melinda Beck et al., The New Fine Print: What Will Congress Do About Your
Medicare? A Primer on What's Coming-and Whether It Will Work, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 43.
64. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
65. Christensen, supra note 25. See also GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MANAGED HEALTH CARE: EFFECTS ON EMPLOYERS: COSTS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE
(1993).
66. Christensen, supra note 25, at 4.
67. Id.
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niques.68 Medicare currently influences treatment of these fee-for-
service beneficiaries in two ways. First, Medicare's Peer Review
Organizations (PROs) monitor the necessity of hospital admissions
and the appropriateness of care provided in hospitals. 69 Second,
through its prospective payment system for hospitals and relative
value scale payment system for physicians, Medicare gives provid-
ers strong financial incentives to manage effectively the resources
used to treat each beneficiary.70 Medicare currently pays substan-
tially discounted prices for both hospital and physician services.
The program pays approximately 90% of costs and less than the
average amount paid by private insurers for a given set of hospital
services. 71
All Medicare-certified hospitals and physicians who accept
Medicare assignments are bound by Medicare's payment rates.72
These providers may collect nothing from patients beyond the pro-
gram's cost sharing limits. For physicians who are nonparticipating
and will not accept assignment, the amount they can charge pa-
tients is limited to no more than 115% of Medicare's payment
rates.73
The future of the Medicare program is currently at the center of
national policy debate. Given current revenue and spending pro-
jections, the Medicare Part A Trust will run out of money early in
the twenty-first century.74 Both Congress and the President have
proposed reducing the rate of growth of Medicare expenditures as
part of their seven-year plans to balance the federal budget. In
1995, the 104th Congress passed Medicare provisions that would
reduce the rate of growth of Medicare spending by $221 billion
between fiscal years 1997 and 2002. 75 However, this legislation was
vetoed by President Clinton, who was willing to accept no more
than $124 billion in Medicare reductions. Although a number of
Medicare proposals have since been advanced, a resolution is un-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
71. Celinda M. Franco, Medicare: Description of Hospital Reimbursement of In-
patient Hospital Care Under the Prospective Payment System 6 (Congressional Re-
search Service Report to Congress No. 93-230, Feb. 17, 1993).
72. Jennifer O'Sullivan & Richard Price, Medicare 2 (Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress No. 95-44, Dec. 23, 1994).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g) (1994).
74. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
75. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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likely in the near future.76 However, the Medicare program's long
term financial health will continue to take center stage in 1997 as
costs continue to increase, the trust fund balance drops, and the
nation's population continues to age.
Medicaid
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, created by Title XIX-
Medical Assistance, a 1965 amendment to the Social Security Act,
providing health care benefits to indigent and medically indigent
persons.77 The program provides insurance for recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC-the main federal wel-
fare program), the disabled, and increasing numbers of children
and pregnant women living in low-income households.78 Medicaid
also covers the cost of nursing home care for elderly Americans
who have exhausted their resources. 79 In addition, Medicaid pro-
vides special payments to assist hospitals treating disproportion-
ately large numbers of poor and uninsured people. 80
In 1993, Medicaid paid for the health care of 3.7 million elderly
persons, 4.9 million blind and disabled persons, 7.4 million adults in
families (mostly the mothers of eligible children), and 16.1 million
children.81 The cost of providing coverage to these 32.1 million in-
dividuals totaled $124.9 billion.82 With annual increases in the
number of individuals who meet the program's eligibility require-
ments, Medicaid's expenditures are increasing at an average rate of
10.7% per year.83 The federal-state tab for Medicaid is expected to
reach $170 billion in fiscal year 1996 and to provide coverage for
more than 37 million Americans. 84
Medicaid covers a broad range of services with few or no cost-
sharing requirements,85 thus ensuring that the poorest, most vul-
nerable populations do not encounter financial barriers to health
76. See, e.g., President Clinton's Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Request, Submitted to
Congress Feb. 5, 1996.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a-1396v (1994).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(10)(A)(i)(I)-1396a(10)(A)(i)(III) (1994).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(4)(A) (1994).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (1994).
81. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, supra note 2, at
1.
82. Id.
83. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: SPENDING PRESSURES DRIVE
STATES TOWARD PROGRAM REINVENTION 5 (Apr. 1995).
84. Colette Fraley, States Guard Their Borders as Medicaid Talks Begin, CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP., June 10, 1995, at 1638.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o (1994).
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services. The federally-mandated benefits package includes in-pa-
tient and outpatient hospital care, physician, midwife, and certified
nurse practitioner services, laboratory and X-ray services, family
planning, nursing home and home health care, and early and peri-
odic screening, diagnosis, and treatment for children under age
21.86
The states administer their Medicaid programs through agencies
which are subject to federal statutes, regulations, and guidelines. 87
States have broad discretion in designing and administering their
Medicaid programs. At their discretion, states may add extra ben-
efits.88 Each state must operate its Medicaid program under a state
plan, submitted to and approved by the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA), a unit of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. 89 The state plan must detail eligibility, benefits,
payment rates, and other program features. A state must also sub-
mit any amendments to an existing Medicaid plan, and receive
HCFA approval before implementing changes in its program.90
The federal government and the states jointly finance Medicaid
services and the associated administrative costs. States often share
their Medicaid financing burden with city and county governments.
Each.year Congress makes federal funds available to match those
funds expended by each state. The federal government matches
state expenditures for health care services covered under the plan
of each state according to a formula that is based on the state's per
capita income. 91
States may apply to HCFA for waivers of federal statutory re-
quirements in order to develop cost-effective alternative methods
of service delivery under their Medicaid programs. States often
seek a freedom-of-choice waiver, under which a state may waive a
recipient's right to unlimited provider choice.92 The freedom-of-
choice waiver allows states to implement statewide, mandatory
managed care demonstration programs that broaden coverage.
93
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1994).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(25) (1994).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1994).
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 430.25 (1994).
93. Id. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, supra note
2, at 2. As of January, 1995, nine states had been granted waivers and several more
had applied and were awaiting HCFA approval. Id.
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At present, 23% of the Medicaid population, representing about
7.8 million Americans, receives medical coverage through HMOs
and other managed care plans.94 Medicaid managed care models
range from HMOs using prepaid capitated care to loose networks
contracting with selected providers for discounted services. HMOs
view those eligible for Medicaid as a major source of future enroll-
ment growth.95 By providing Medicaid patients with their own pri-
mary care doctors, HMOs believe they can sharply curtail the use
of high-cost emergency room care and rein in surging costs while
simultaneously improving health care for the poor and improving
the treatment of individuals with chronic diseases.
But the shift to managed Medicaid has come at a price. Florida,
which has spent the past five years trying to move as many Medi-
caid patients as possible into managed care to help curb costs, has
struggled to crack down on widespread abuses, including fraudu-
lent marketing and lapses in care.96 Many Medicaid recipients
have reported mistreatment by HMOs or their sales representa-
tives. Managed care plans are not always recipient-friendly. For ex-
ample, a recipient may enroll in an HMO with facilities on the
other side of the state, or a recipient may not fully understand the
way in which the plan operates (e.g., restricted choice).
The implementation of Medicaid managed care plans is further
complicated by states' attempts to balance two competing con-
cerns: (1) trying to promote the growth of Medicaid HMOs in an
effort to save money and provide coverage for more people, and
(2) enforcing quality-of-care standards. For example, in 1993, Ten-
nessee proposed a five-year managed care demonstration program
requiring several waivers to the Medicaid program. The program,
known as Tenn Care, provides health care benefits to Medicaid re-
cipients, uninsured state residents, and those whose medical condi-
tions make them uninsurable. All enrollees must receive medical
care through capitated managed care plans-either HMOs or
PPOs.97 Tenn Care has experienced several problems. Experts be-
lieve it went too far too fast, creating access problems and severe
94. Ron Winslow, Medical Upheaval: Welfare Recipients Are a Hot Commodity In
Managed Care Now, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at Al.
95. Id.
96. Robert Pear, Florida Struggles to Lift Medicaid Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1995, at A12.
97. Interview with Steven A. Kroll, Director of Federal Relations, Healthcare As-
sociation of New York State, in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1995).
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economic dislocation for health care providers. It stretched Medi-
caid dollars further by providing coverage to more people.98
Changes to the Medicaid program are an important factor in the
historic balanced budget debate between the 104th Congress and
the Clinton Administration. The federal fiscal year 1996 budget
reconciliation bill approved by Congress and vetoed by President
Clinton would have reduced the rate of federal Medicaid spending
by $133 billion over seven years.99
Several months of on-and-off budget negotiations between Presi-
dent Clinton, Republican congressional leaders, the nation's gover-
nors, and groups of moderate senators and representatives have
hinged, in part, on Medicaid reform. The Republican leadership
advocates turning program control over to the states in the form of
block grants. 100 Under this approach, each state would receive a
limited annual lump sum from the federal government to adminis-
ter its program in whatever manner it sees fit. States would deter-
mine eligibility, benefits, and payment rates with minimal federal
oversight. 10' The President, governors, and moderate members of
Congress prefer to reduce spending by instituting a per-capita ceil-
ing that would limit the amount of federal spending per Medicaid
recipient. 0 2 To date, the future of the Medicaid program remains
uncertain.
The Uninsured and Underinsured
The problems of the uninsured and underinsured plague our na-
tion's health care system. The uninsured and underinsured pay for
only a fraction of the health care they receive. Through cost-shift-
ing, a substantial amount of Medicare, Medicaid, and private insur-
ance funds actually pay for the care of those unable to afford it.
The best estimates indicate that the number of people without any
health insurance rose from 31 million in 1987 to 39.7 million in
1993.103 "During [the] same period, the proportion of the popula-
98. Id.
99. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
MEDICAID AS REESTIMATED UNDER DECEMBER 1995 BASELINE (Dec. 18, 1995).
100. Health Provisions of OMB Section-By-Section Analysis of Clinton Administra-
tion Budget, GOP Conference Report, Coalition Proposal Dated Dec. 9, 1995, 3
Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at D-42 (Dec. 18, 1995).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. LAURA SUMMER & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRI-
ORITIES, TRENDS IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1987 TO 1993 1 (Oct. 19, 1994).
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tion without insurance increased from 12.9% to 15.3%."'' 1 In 1993,
an estimated 9.5 million of the uninsured were children. 10 5 Over
83 % of the uninsured belonged to families that included a working
adult. 106 Self-employed, part-time workers, and full-time workers
in low-wage industries were most likely to lack coverage for them-
selves or their families. 10 7
A larger proportion of the poor than of the non-poor lack insur-
ance.' 8 In 1993, 29.3% of the poor had no health insurance, while
12.8% of the non-poor lacked insurance. 0 9 But the large majority
of people without insurance fall above the federal poverty line. Of
those without insurance in 1994, 71% had incomes above the pov-
erty line. 110 The lack of health insurance significantly impedes ac-
cess to health care services. Spending per person on those without
insurance only amounts to slightly less than two-thirds of spending
for people who have insurance, and the uninsured generally re-
ceive lower quality care than that received by insured
individuals."'
More than 10 million Americans are estimated to be underin-
sured.112 Although insured, their policies do not cover all of their
anticipated medical needs. Americans who purchase only cata-
strophic coverage must pay for routine check-ups and preventive
care services out-of-pocket. As a result, they often neglect these
important health care services. Many Americans have health in-
surance policies that do not cover pre-existing conditions. Others
are covered by insurance plans that impose spending caps. When.
someone covered by such a policy becomes sick, she may easily
reach this cap and become financially devastated by her illness.
Several factors contribute to the rising number of underinsured
and uninsured. For most privately insured Americans, health in-
surance coverage is tied to employment. When these Americans
104. Id.
105. THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: THE
PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 2 (Oct. 1993).
106. Beth C. Fuchs & Mark Merlis, Health Care Fact Sheet: Health Care Reform in
the 104th Congress 1 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. 95-
138, Jan. 13, 1995).
107. THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 3-4.
108. SUMMER & SHAPIRO, supra note 103, at 2.
109. Id.
110. FUCHS & MERLIS, supra note 106, at 1.
111. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MANAGED COMPETITION AND ITS POTEN-
TIAL TO REDUCE HEALTH SPENDING 1 (1993).
112. Interview with Steven A. Kroll, Director of Federal Relations, Healthcare As-
sociation of New York State, in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1995).
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change or lose their jobs, no guarantee exists that they or their
families will remain insured. Increasing health care costs encourage
many employers to reduce benefits or to require larger employee
contributions. Other employers limit insurance to employees and
are unwilling to subsidize spousal and dependent coverage. Still
others choose to drop health insurance altogether. Some employ-
ees opt for cash rather than health insurance coverage. 113 Medical
underwriting (whereby applicants are rated according to age and
health status), waiting periods, and lack of coverage for pre-ex-
isting conditions also make health insurance unattractive to those
most likely to need it."'
Risk selection and experience rating often aggravate the
problems of the under- and uninsured. As health care costs rise,
younger, healthier individuals and those who must seek out health
insurance on their-own (e.g., the self-employed) often decline to or
cannot afford to purchase health insurance. Furthermore, when it
comes to health care expenses, the Internal Revenue Code, even as
amended, discriminates between individuals and businesses. Self-
employed individuals can deduct only 30% of their health care in-
surance expenses in 1996, increasing to 40% in 1997, 45% in 1997
through 2002, 50% in 2003, 60% in 2004, 70% in 2005, 80% in 2006
and thereafter." 5 Businesses can deduct 100% of their employees'
health insurance expenses.' 6 And because large employers who
provide health insurance to their workers typically demand experi-
ence rating for their group, insurers cannot adequately spread risk.
The result is high-priced insurance for individual and small group
purchasers. 17
The current restructuring of the health care system has not alle-
viated the plight of the underinsured and uninsured. The increas-
ing presence of for-profit entities in the health care system has
transferred funds to shareholders. For instance, for-profit HMOs
negotiate rate reductions with hospitals. The HMOs reap substan-
tial returns while hospitals struggle to recoup their losses, often in
the form of reduced services. 1" 8 In the case of public not-for-profit
113. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 105, at
4.
114. Id. at 3.
115. I.R.C. § 162(1)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (amended by the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 311(a), 110 Stat. 1936
(1996)).
116. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 34, at Al, A4.
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hospitals that provide a disproportionately large amount of free
care to the uninsured, these already financially vulnerable facilities
can cut costs only by reducing services to the poor and the
uninsured. 119
When the uninsured and underinsured do obtain access to the
health care system, they frequently cannot afford to pay the full
cost of their care. As a result, both physicians and hospitals accept
losses in the form of uncompensated care. 2 ° The burden of un-
compensated care does not fall evenly on providers. Public and
teaching hospitals provide a disproportionate share of uncompen-
sated care compared to proprietary and voluntary nonteaching
hospitals.
After a year-long struggle, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, popularly known as the Kassebaum-
Kennedy Act (KKA), was signed into law on August 21, 1996.121
At its core, the measure is designed to improve portability and con-
tinuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual
markets.122 It also includes provisions to promote the use of medi-
cal savings accounts and improve access to long-term care.
Portability and Continuity Reforms
Guaranteed Issue
KKA regulates the availability of private health insurance cover-
age by requiring health insurance issuers to cover any group or in-
dividual who applies, without regard to health status or claims
experience. 123 Insurers that offer general coverage in a given state's
small group market are required to offer coverage to every small
119. Interview with Steven A. Kroll, Director of Federal Relations Healthcare As-
sociation of New York State, in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1995).
120. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, UNSPONSORED HOSPITAL CARE AND
MEDICAID SHORTFALLS, 1980-1991: A FACT SHEET UPDATE,(Nov. 1992). Uncompen-
sated care is the sum of bad debt and charity care absorbed by a provider in providing
medical care for patients who are uninsured or are unable to pay. AMERICAN HospI-
TAL ASSOCIATION RESOURCE CENTER, HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION TERMINOLOGY
60 (1986). Bad debt is defined as the payments providers expect to be made that are
not. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra, at 19. Charity care is defined as the
costs of services for patients who are not expected to pay. Id.
121. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter Health Reform Act of 1996].
122. REPORT ON H.R. 3103, HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTA-
BILITY ACT OF 1996, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 736, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), reprinted
in 4 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-59 (Aug. 5, 1996).
123. I.R.C. § 9802(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (added by the Health Reform Act of
1996, § 401(a)).
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employer (defined as two to fifty employees) that applies for such
coverage.
All issuers in the individual market will be required to offer cov-
erage to all eligible individuals moving from group to individual
coverage. To be eligible, the individual (1) must have been covered
under one or more health plans for the past eighteen months; (2)
must not be eligible for group coverage, Medicare, or Medicaid;
and (3) must have exhausted continuation of coverage under CO-
BRA. 124 Insurers may offer (1) a choice among all their plans, (2)
a choice between their two most popular plans, or (3) a choice be-
tween two new policies, one with a high deductible and one with a
low deductible. KKA also provides for special enrollment periods
under group coverage for employees who experience a change in
family composition, employment status, or employment status of a
family member.125 During these periods, employees must be of-
fered the opportunity to enroll in the plan if they previously de-
clined coverage or to change the individual or family basis of
coverage.
Guaranteed Renewal
The law requires insurers, with certain exceptions, to renew cov-
erage in a group health plan, which is a multi-employer plan, with-
out regard to health status or use of services. 126 An insurer may,
however, discontinue coverage in cases of non-payment of pre-
mium, fraud, or similar reasons unrelated to health status.
Preexisting Condition Restrictions
KKA limits periods before preexisting conditions are covered in
group market insurance. Specifically, the law limits to twelve
months the period in which a group insurer could refuse or limit
coverage for a health condition that was treated or diagnosed on
the six-month period before enrollment. 27 The twelve-month pe-
riod is reduced by the period of continuous coverage before enroll-
ment. KKA does not limit the use of preexisting condition
restrictions in the individual market, except for eligible people who
move from group to individual coverage.
124. I.R.C. § 9801(0(1) (West Supp. 1997).
125. Id.
126. I.R.C. § 9803(a) (West Supp. 1997) (added by the Health Reform Act of 1996,
§ 401(a)). The term "multi-employer plan" is defined in I.R.C. § 414(f) (1994).
127. I.R.C. § 9801(a) (West Supp. 1997) (added by the Health Reform Act of 1996
§ 401(a)). The term "preexisting condition exclusion" is defined in I.R.C.
§ 9801(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
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Tax-Related Health Provisions: Medical Savings Accounts
KKA includes a medical savings account demonstration project.
From 1997 through 2000, 750,000 policyholders may open medical
savings accounts. 128 The trial population includes employees of
companies of fifty or fewer, self-employed individuals, and unem-
ployed persons.129 Individuals would purchase high deductible in-
surance plans (i.e., catastrophic coverage).13 ° They would then
open a medical savings account to which tax-deductible contribu-
tions could be made.13 1
In addition to earnings on the account being taxfree, individuals
may draw money from the account to pay for qualified medical
expenses, taxfree. 3 2 For individuals age sixty-five and under, with-
drawals for other purposes are subject to an early withdrawal pen-
alty of 15% and are taxable. Individuals over age 65 may withdraw
for other purposes without incurring the 15% penalty. 133
Long-Term Care Insurance and Services
Prior to the enactment of KKA, long-term care insurance premi-
ums were generally not deductible for federal income tax purposes.
Under the new law, the cost of long-term care insurance premiums,
as well as the cost of qualified long-term care service, is included in
the definition of deductible medical care, up to specified, annual
dollar limits.134 To the extent that the cost of long-term care premi-
ums and services qualify as medical services, their cost is subject to
various limitations on deductibility.
Accelerated Death Benefits
Chronically or terminally ill individuals may receive life insur-
ance policy benefits before death without federal income tax con-
128. I.R.C. § 220 (West Supp. 1997) (added by the Health Reform Act of 1996
§ 301(a)).
129. I.R.C §§ 220(c)(1)(A), (c)(4) (West Supp. 1997).
130. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
131. I.R.C. § 220(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The amount allowable as a deduction to
an individual for the tax year for a contribution to a medical savings account cannot
exceed the sum of the specified monthly limitations for months during the tax year
that the individual is an eligible individual.
132. I.R.C. § 220(f)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (added by the Health Reform Act of
1996, § 301(a)).
133. I.R.C. § 220(f)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1997).
134. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
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sequences. 31 Thus, a chronically or terminally ill person can cash
in or sell a life insurance policy without paying any tax, and use the
proceeds to pay for the cost of health care.
Individual Retirement Accounts
KKA allows taxpayers who spend more than 7.5% of their ad-
justed gross income on medical expenses to withdraw money from
tax-deferred individual retirement accounts without incurring the
10% tax penalty on early withdrawals. 136 In addition, the 10% tax
penalty does not apply to certain unemployed individuals who
withdraw, to pay for medical insurance. 137
II. Current Status of Community Based Care
Introduction
This section first discusses, in general terms, the delivery of am-
bulatory health care in the United States. It next focuses on the
delivery of four specific types of community-based health care: (1)
free clinics, (2) community health clinics, (3) hospital clinics, and
(4) for-profit clinics.
Ambulatory Health care Delivery
Diversity characterizes the U.S. health care delivery system.
Apart from community-based health care clinics discussed later in
this section, three major types of ambulatory health care delivery
exist: private practice, managed health care organizations, and
hospitals.
Private Practice
Private medical practices in the United States have typically
been run on a fee-for-service basis.138 A physician in private prac-
tice delivers care to a patient in return for monetary compensa-
135. I.R.C. § 101(g) (West Supp. 1997), amended by the Health Reform Act of 1996
§ 331(a). The terms "terminally ill" and "chronically ill" individuals are defined in
I.R.C. § 101(g) (C) and (D) (West Supp. 1997).
136. IRC § 72(t)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (as amended by the Health Reform Act
of 1996, § 361(a)).
137. IRC § 72(t)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1997) (as amended by the Health Reform Act
of 1996, § 361(b)).
138. Andrew P. Mezey & Robert S. Lawrence, Ambulatory Care, in JONAS'S
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 122, 124 (Anthony R. Kovner ed.,
5th ed. 1995).
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tion.139 Private practice has functioned as the dominant means by
which physicians deliver health care in the United States. 140
Managed Health care Organizations
Managed health care organizations attempt to deliver health
care in an economically efficient manner by managing patient care.
Typically, managed health care organizations use primary care
141
providers, usually physicians, to act as gatekeepers.142 The primary
care provider sees the organization's members for both regular
check-ups and medical problems. When a member reports a medi-
cal problem, the primary care provider evaluates whether the
member should be sent to a specialist for treatment. 143 Controlling
member access to other health care providers enables a managed
care organization to control costs better.144
Hospitals
Hospitals 14 5 typically offer traditional in-patient and outpatient
(same day) treatment, and emergency services. 146 Although reve-
nues from in-patient services remain the main source of income for
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Primary care represents basic or general health care, the patient's usual entry
point into the medical system, as opposed to specialist or subspecialist care. A more
specific definition remains problematic because some health services (e.g. , pap
smears, controlling hypertension) are considered primary care by some and preven-
tive care by others. See, e.g., Mary T. Koska, Primary Care: Hospitals Begin to Target
Community Needs, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 5, 1990, at 24 (defining pri-
mary care as ongoing care of the patient based on a continuous relationship with a
provider).
142. Mezey & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 127.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 126.
145. Although a variety of terms can be used to describe hospitals, they can be
classified into four basic categories: teaching hospitals, multihospital systems, public
hospitals, and rural hospitals. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Teaching
hospitals are committed to education, research, and patient care. They represent 6%
of all hospitals in the United States. As the name suggests, multihospital systems are
systems that oversee the direction of two or more hospitals. Multihospital systems
represent 43% of all U.S. hospitals. Public hospitals are facilities owned by federal,
state, or local governments. T'pically, they are required to provide services to indi-
gent individuals for free or at a discount. Approximately 21% of all U.S. hospitals are
public hospitals. Rural hospitals are facilities outside a metropolitan area as defined
by the U.S. Census Bureau. About 43% of all hospitals are classified as rural.
Anthony R. Kovner, Hospitals, in JONAS'S HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES 162, 169-70 (Anthony R. Kovner ed., 5th ed. 1995).
146. Id. at 168.
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most hospitals, 147 outpatient, or ambulatory, services are becoming
increasingly important. In recent years, third party payers have be-
come increasingly reluctant to pay for in-patient treatments, forc-
ing hospitals to look for alternative means to meet their expenses
and keep their doors open.148
Hospital emergency departments are designed to treat individu-
als who need immediate medical attention.1 49 But emergency de-
partments in many hospitals, especially public hospitals, are
crowded with individuals who otherwise lack access to the health
care system. 150 As one hospital administrator noted, "[t]he use of
emergency rooms for primary care has become so routine that
some patients, particularly indigent ones, name their ER physicians
when asked about their primary care-giver."' 15 Because many
emergency room patients are indigent or are Medicaid recipients,
they end up not only crowding out those truly in need of emer-
gency care, but also costing hospitals money because their care is
not fully compensated. 52 Furthermore, because the care received
by the patients is primarily episodic, it does not have the long-term
benefits more continuous care provides. 53
To address the problems of shrinking in-patient populations and
emergency department overcrowding, hospitals have expanded
their ambulatory care programs.1 54 Underlying such initiatives is
the realization by hospitals that primary care is the access point of
patients into the health care delivery system.' 55 In addition to fo-
cusing on acute, short-term care, hospitals are now focusing on pre-
ventive, coordinated care.156
147. Mezey & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 128.
148. 'Virtual' Integration, Community Focus, Called New Vision for California Re-
form, Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at D-30 (Nov. 7, 1994).
149. Kovner, supra note 145, at 168.
150. Id.
151. Peggy McNamara et al., Patchwork Access: Primary Care in EDs on the Rise,
Hosp & HEALTH NETWORKS, May 20, 1993, at 44. McNamara notes that in 1990,
43% of all emergency department visits were for non-urgent conditions. Id.
152. Id. at 46.
153. Id.
154. Anne M. Murphy & Tecla A. Murphy, Using the Emergence of Primary Health
Care in Hospital Strategy and Community Reform, 25 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 321
(1992).
155. Koska, supra note 141, at 25.
156. Howard J. Anderson, Hospitals Seek New Ways to Integrate Health Care,
Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 5, 1992, at 26. This expanded form of hospital
care is known as "vertical integration." Because hospitals are still developing verti-
cally integrated delivery systems, a universal model does not exist. According to some
experts, however, such systems will probably have in common the following: (1) the
development of a continuum of health care, with a primary care network as the focal
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Community-Based Health care Clinics
Community-based health care clinics have delivered primary
care for years. This article next examines the current delivery of
primary health care through four types of community-based health
care facilities: free clinics, community health centers, hospital clin-
ics, and for-profit clinics.
Free Clinics
In an attempt to deal with the large number of uninsured Ameri-
cans, hundreds of free clinics have been established in the United
States.15 7 Because the initiatives for these clinics are extremely lo-
cal in nature, the clinics have varying organizational structures,
services, and patients, and provide different treatments.
Most free clinics are run by predominantly volunteer staffs.'58
There is usually a paid executive director and possibly one or two
other paid support personnel. The remainder of a free clinic's
health care staff typically includes a varying mixture of physician
assistants, nurse practitioners, doctors, dentists, dental assistants,
psychiatrists, medical students, nurses, social workers, pharmacists,
and lay people who volunteer their time by working at the clinic
site159 and/or accepting uncompensated referrals. 6 '
point; (2) the integration of health care services, allowing patients to move efficiently
through the system; and (3) the collection of data concerning community impact so
that hospitals may be held accountable for meeting their missions. Id. at 30. Vertically
integrated systems encompass various components, including health clinics and clinic
networks, long-term care facilities, urgi- and emergi-care centers, surgi-care centers,
and drug treatment programs. Mezey & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 140.
157. Kevin C. Kelleher, Free Clinics: A Solution That Can Work ... Now!, 266
JAMA 838 (1991).
158. See Susan Smith, A Healthy Dose of Caring With the Help of Many Dedicated
Volunteers: Chesapeake's Free Clinic Serves Needy Patients, VIRGINIA PILOT AND
LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 13, 1995, at 12; Anne Carothers-Kay, Free Clinics Making Impact,
DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 9, 1995, at 1; Health Lines, Lorain County Free Clinic Is
Helping All of Us Stay Healthy, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 28, 1993, at Supp. 2; Jim
Nesbitt, A Local Prescription for a National Ailment: Free Clinic Serves the Uninsured
Working Poor in Roanoke, VA, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 10, 1993, at 10A.
159. Paul DeMarco & Mohan Nadkarni, The Charlottesville Free Clinic, 269 JAMA
2496 (1993); Kevin C. Kelleher, Free Clinic: Health Care that Remembers to Care,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Oct. 20, 1994, at A17; Health Lines, Lorain
County Free Clinic Is Helping All of Us Stay Healthy, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 28,
1993, at Supp. 2; Wendi C. Thomas, Health Reform on the Front Lines: Volunteers
Take a Crisis Into Their Own Hands and Make a Difference at a Free Health Clinic,
THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 1, 1994, at C1.
160. Kevin C. Kelleher, Care for the Poor? We Found a Solution, MED. ECON., Mar.
8, 1993, at 136, 138.
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Because most clinics receive only a minority of their funding
from their local governments, 161 a free clinic's ability to serve its
patients' needs depends on the generosity of its community. Free
clinics obtain much of their funding through grants and through
individual and corporate donations. 62 For example, in 1993 the
Bradley Free Clinic in Roanoke, Virginia received 27% of its
budget from the United Way, 40% from foundation grants, 17%
from county and government grants, and the remaining 16% from
individual and corporate donations.163 The Los Angeles Free
Clinic receives one-third of its budget from state, county, and city
governments and the remainder through private donations. 164 In
addition to monetary donations, many corporations support free
clinics by donating their health care products. 65 For example, do-
nations in kind by physicians and hospitals enable clinics to dis-
tribute drugs they could not otherwise afford.' 66 Illustrative is the
Bradley Free Clinic, which has an annual operating budget of
$300,000,167 but supplied its patients with $315,000 worth of
donated drugs in 1993.168
Free clinics provide general ambulatory care and are neither
equipped nor intended to treat complex, acute cases requiring hos-
pitalization. 69  The specific services each clinic offers varies
greatly. Some clinics offer only the most basic services such as
blood pressure checks and school physicals. 170  Others offer a
broad range of services, such as dermatological, ob-gyn, and dental
161. Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 10A.
162. See DeMarco & Nadkarni, supra note 159, at 2496; Grant Dillman, Free Medi-
cal Clinic Realizes Doctor's Drbam, THE PLAIN DEALER Dec. 20, 1994, at 8E; Health
Lines, supra note 158; Morning Edition: Free Clinics Provide Quick Relief to Health
Care Crisis (National Public Radio Broadcast, Transcript No. 1211-6, Nov. 8, 1993)
(available on Lexis, News library, Script file) [hereinafter Free Clinics]; Nesbitt, supra
note 158, at 10A; Thomas, supra note 159; Ryan Ver Berkmoes, An Upscale Clinic for
the Down-and-Out: Los Angeles Free Clinic, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 9, 1990, at 7.
163. Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 10A.
164. Ver Berkmoes, supra note 162, at 7.
165. See Free Clinics, supra note 162; Thomas, supra note 159; Kelleher, supra note
160, at 137.
166. See Twenty Years of Free Medicine, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 7,
1994, at A6.
167. National Directory of Free Clinics, Free Clinic Foundation Of America.
168. Id.
169. Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 10A; Dawn Gibeau, Free Clinics Deliver Basic Care
With a Vision, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., June 30, 1993, at 6.
170. Gibeau, supra note 169, at 6; Phil McCombs, Where Healing Comes Without a
Price Tag: For 25 Years, Free Clinic Has Helped D.C.'s Poor, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
1993, at Dl.
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services. 17 1 Still others offer substance abuse and psychological
counseling. 172
The medical services offered by clinics are generally dictated by
their communities' needs. Because they are so local in nature, clin-
ics have the ability to see trends in their communities and to adapt
to them.173 For example, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where there
are an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 intravenous drug users and a resur-
gence of heroin use has occurred, the Free Clinic of Greater Cleve-
land operates a free needle exchange service. 174 Similarly, the
Kansas City Free Clinic, located in Kansas City, Missouri, plans to
open a clinic run by Native American doctors, nurses, and case
managers to treat the four federally recognized Indian tribes that
reside within 100 miles. 175
Although clinics are responsive to their communities' needs,
they are mindful of not duplicating readily available services. For
example, the free clinic chain that operates in central Iowa does
not offer obstetrical examinations, X-rays, or major lab work be-
cause those services are provided by other facilities or by special-
ists who accepts the clinic's referrals without compensation.176
Through ease of location and expanded hours of operation, clin-
ics alleviate access and transportation problems, both of which
plague the communities they serve. 177 Clinics are generally located
in areas in which most of their clients reside, thereby reducing
transportation problems. 178 Most clinics remain open in the eve-
ning, enabling their working clients to take advantage of clinic
services without missing work. 179
Free clinics tend to deliver two types of care: episodic and con-
tinuous. Episodic care addresses an individual's problems as they
arise. Patients who receive episodic care turn to the clinic because
they are experiencing an acute medical crisis. These patients will
171. Kelleher, supra note 159, at A17.
172. Clay Evans, Free Clinic-New Setting, Same Mission, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1990, at B1.
173. Kelleher, supra note 157, at 838.
174. Joe Dirck, Free Clinic Braves Controversy Again, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec.
18, 1994, at lB.
175. Laura R. Hockaday, An Insurance Policy For Those Who Have None: Free
Health Clinic Provides Care for Those 'Lost Between the Cracks', THE KANSAS CITY
STAR, Feb. 5, 1995, at H8.
176. Carothers-Kay, supra note 158.
177. Kelleher, supra note 157, at 838.
178. Id.
179. Malcolm Gladwell, Doctors Without Bills: Saving the World a Patient at a Time,
REASON, Mar. 1992, at 40, 42.
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probably not return to the clinic once treated for their ailment.1 s0
For instance, the Los Angeles Free Clinic sees many of its patients
only once. 181 Although episodic care addresses the immediate
needs of the patients, it fails to establish a more permanent rela-
tionship between patients and care-givers. Nonetheless, episodic
care provided by clinics offers indigent patients primary care. In
turn, this primary care alternative relieves emergency departments
that would otherwise bear the burden of providing primary care to
these patients. 182
Although episodic treatment focuses on addressing the immedi-
ate needs of the patient, it can also detect potentially serious health
risks. As one free clinic volunteer recounted, "[W]e saw a patient
here who came in with a cold, but when we checked her out, she
had tremendous high blood pressure, and didn't know it, hadn't
been treated for it. If she had gone another six months without any
treatment, there's a fair likelihood she'd have had a stroke. 83
Although episodic treatment does not serve as a substitute for
comprehensive preventive care, it does offer a degree of medical
care to people who would probably not otherwise receive any
treatment.184
In addition to episodic care, some clinics offer care which is more
continuous in nature. The Heartland Community Health Clinic,
for example, has an active caseload of 1,000 patients who go to the
clinic regularly for their medical needs.185 Although this care is
continuous, it does not provide patients true continuity of care.186
When an individual receives care at a private practice or at an
HMO facility, he or she establishes an ongoing relationship with
one care-giver who follows his or her medical progress. By con-
trast, a patient who visits a free clinic will probably not see the
same care-giver on two successive visits. 87 Instead, a patient will
be seen by the care-giver who happens to be volunteering at the
time of the appointment.18 8 Without continuous care provided by
180. Ver Berkmoes, supra note 162, at 7.
181. Id. at 9.
182. See, e.g., Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 10A.
183. Free Clinics, supra note 162.
184. See Kelleher, supra note 157, at 839.
185. Interview with Alison H. Watkins, Executive Director of the Heartland Com-
munity Health Clinic, in Peoria, IL (June 21, 1995).
186. DeMarco & Nadkarni, supra note 159, at 2496; WASH. REV. CODE ANNm .
§ 4.24.300 (West 1995).
187. DeMarco & Nadkarni, supra note 159, at 2496.
188. Id.
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one care-giver, a patient cannot receive comprehensive health
care.
189
Each free clinic establishes criteria for the individuals it will
treat. Some free clinics will not turn an individual away even if he
or she can afford to pay for treatment.190 Other free clinics screen
patients to assure that they fall within the clinic's financial guide-
lines for treatment eligibility. 191 Although a typical free clinic
serves many groups, including homeless persons, HIV/AIDS pa-
tients, runaways, and ptrostitutes, 192 the working poor compose a
fast-growing component of the clinic's clientele. 193 The working
poor are individuals who work but cannot afford insurance of any
kind. They are "too affluent for Medicaid but too far down the
income ladder to afford health insurance .on their own, too young
for Medicare and too underemployed to be covered by an em-
ployer's policy."'194 Without free clinics, the working poor would
fall between the cracks.' 95
United States Bureau of Primary Health care Programs
The U.S. Bureau of Primary Health Care administers nine major
federal grant programs designed to support primary health services
for medically underserved, disadvantaged, high-risk, and hard-to-
reach populations. 96 These nine programs include the Community
Health Center Program, the Migrant Health Program, School-
Based Clinics, the Health Care for the Homeless Program, the Fed-
erally Qualified Health Center Look-Alike Program, and the Rural
Health Clinics Program. 97
189. See id.
190. Ver Berkmoes, supra note 162, at 7.
191. Kelleher, supra note 157, at 838.
192. Evans, supra note 172, at B1.
193. Id.; Jean McCann, Free Clinic Make a Comeback, 31 MED. WORLD NEWS 49
(1990); Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 1OA; Joan Stanus, Free Clinic Offers TLC: Treating
People With Dignity and Respect Is as Important as Quality Health Care at This Facil-
ity, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT & THE LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 6, 1994, at 10; DeMarco &
Nadkarni, supra note 159, at 2496.
194. Nesbitt, supra note 158, at 10A.
195. Hockaday, supra note 175, at H8.
196. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BUREAU OF PRIMARY HEALTH
CARE: PRIMARY CARE PROGRAM DIRECTORY I (1994).
197. Id. The other programs are: the Alzheimer's Demonstration Grant Program,
the Black Lung Clinics Program, the HIV Early Intervention Services Program, the
Public Housing Primary Care Program, and the Integrated Primary Care and Sub-
stance Abuse Treatment Program. Id.
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Community Health Clinics and Migrant Health Clinics
Community Health Clinics (CHCs), formerly Neighborhood
Health Clinics, are private, not-for-profit health clinics owned and
operated by local communities. 198 Originally designed to provide
comprehensive health care and social services for the poor, these
clinics now strive to bring cost-efficient, affordable health care to
the medically underserved in urban and rural areas. Currently,
over 500 CHCs serve approximately 6,000,000 people annually. 199
Like CHCs, migrant health clinics (MHCs) try to bring cost-ef-
fective, affordable health care to migrant populations.10 To ad-
dress the special needs of migrants, MHCs also incorporate efforts
to emphasize environmental health services and patient mobility.2 1
Initially, the vast majority of the CHC/MHC client population fell
below the poverty level.20 2 Today, however, CHCs/MHCs serve a
mixture of patients at, below, and above the poverty level.2 0 3 This
change resulted from two factors. First, clinics have expanded into
rural areas with more affluent populations. Second, clinics have
actively sought patients who can afford to pay for services to make
up for federal funding shortfalls. 204
Nevertheless, the vast majority of CHC/MHC patients are unin-
sured or receive publicly provided health insurance. Specifically,
49% are uninsured, and 39% receive publicly provided health in-
surance.20 5 A majority of those with public health insurance are
Medicaid recipients.20 6 Only 12% of CHC/MHC patients have pri-
vate insurance.20 7 The Shawnee Health Service Development Cor-
poration, a not-for-profit corporation that operates five CHC/
MHC sites in southern Illinois, has a typical patient population,
198. NATIONAL Ass'N OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS, INC., AMERICA'S
HEALTH CENTERS: ACCESSIBLE, EFFICIENT PROVIDERS OF QUALITY HEALTH CARE
FOR UNDERSERVED PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 2 (1995).
199. John T. Hammarlund, Community Health Centers and Rising Malpractice Pre-
miums: An Overview of the Community Health Center Program and Proposed Solu-
tions to the Malpractice Insurance Rate Crisis, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 137
(1992).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 254b (1994).
201. Alan W. Strange, Financing of Outpatient Care: The Case of Community
Health Centers, 13(4) J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 46, 47 (1990).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Hammarlund, supra note 199, at 139.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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80% of whom are uninsured or receive Medicaid.2 °8 CHC/MHCs
require all patients to pay for services received. 0 9 Payment is cal-
culated using the national poverty index.2t ° Patients at or below
the federal poverty level pay a nominal fee.21' Patients above the
poverty level by less than 200% pay on a sliding-scale basis.212 All
other patients pay in full for services rendered.21 3
Although CHC/MHCs are private entities, each represents a
public-private partnership between a clinic and the federal govern-
ment. Under the Public Health Service Act,21 4 CHC/MHCs re-
ceive approximately 50% of their funding from the federal
government. 215 This funding alleviates revenue shortfalls and helps
keep the clinics financially sound.216 To receive federal funding,
CHC/MHCs must meet certain federal requirements.217 The clinics
must offer accessible comprehensive care, including physician serv-
ices, diagnostic and radiological services, preventive care, emer-
218ath sriegency care, transportation services, and health services
information.219 Clinics must also provide patient case manage-
ment220 and must offer appropriate supplemental care and refer-
rals.22 ' In addition, clinics must meet federal staffing, productivity,
and quality assurance standards.2 2
Federal rules also require control of CHC/MHCs to remain in
the hands of their local communities. These rules stem from the
premise that a community responds more favorably to ideas gener-
ated by its members and will, therefore, more readily accept a
clinic with community representation.223 Community control of a
CHC/MHC is established through a governing board, a majority of
208. PAUL H. CAMPBELL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION: A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY AND MIGRANT HEALTH
CENTERS 91 (1990).
209. Strange, supra note 201, at 47.
210. Id. at 46.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 42 U.S.C.A. § 254b-c (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
215. Ann Zuvekas, Community and Migrant Health Centers: An Overview, 13(4) J.
AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 1, 2 (1990).
216. Hammarlund, supra note 199, at 142.
217. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 254c(b) (1994).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a)(5) (1994).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a)(6) (1994).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 254c(a)(2)-(3), (b)(2) (1994).
222. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM EXPEC-
TATIONS FOR COMMUNITY AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTERS 22 (1991).
223. See Zuvekas, supra note 215, at 3.
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whom are clinic patients.224 The board oversees major decisions,
including budgetary considerations, and controls clinic opera-
tions.2 5 Through the governing board, which has developed the
trust of the community and the power to implement changes, CHC/
MHCs effectively respond to the needs of their communities.
226
In addition to federal funding and patient payments, CHC/
MHCs receive funding from local governments, hospitals, private
foundations, and public insurers, including Medicare and Medi-
caid. 27 Under the Federally Qualified Health Center Program,
Medicaid reimburses CHC/MHCs 100% of reasonable costs, and
Medicare reimburses up to 80% of reasonable costs. 22 8
School-Based Clinics
Established in the late 1960s,229 the number of school-based clin-
ics (SBCs) skyrocketed in the 1990s 230 and now number over two
hundred nationwide. 31 SBCs attempt to improve the health of
school children through the provision of comprehensive health
care.232 SBC services typically include primary care, health educa-
tion programs, and reproductive health services.233 Some SBCs of-
fer dental screenings, mental health services, and substance abuse
services. 2 4 According to a six-cite study conducted by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, such SBC services
have successfully improved access to care, resulting in reduced
school dismissals, absenteeism, and dropouts.235
224. 42 U.S.C. § 253c(e)(3)(G) (1994).
225. Zuvekas, supra note 215, at 4.
226. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services advances community in-
volvement by requiring centers to engage in community-based program planning.
These planning sessions have led some clinics to develop special programs to address
problems in their communities such as teen pregnancy, substance abuse, infant mor-
tality, and AIDS. Hammarlund, supra note 199, at 138 n.20.
227. Zuvekas, supra note 215, at 2.
,228. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(u) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1994).
229. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SCHOOL BASED CLINICS
THAT WORK 2.
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id. at v.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 17. This information is based on a six-site study conducted by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
234. Id.
235. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 229, at 11-15.
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Generally, CHCs manage SBCs,2 36 which receive a large portion
of their funding through federal grants.2 37 Additional SBC funding
includes private grants, Medicaid payments, and patient fees.238
Health Care for the Homeless Program
Under the Health Care for the Homeless Program, HCHs are
required to provide homeless persons with comprehensive primary
health care services and substance abuse services.239 In addition,
HCHs must, have appropriate referral and outreach mechanisms.24 °
Federally Qualified Health Centers and Look-Alikes
Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and FQHC Look-
Alikes serve the primary and preventive health needs of Medicaid,
Medicare, and medically indigent patients living in designated
medically underserved areas.241 FQHCs are public or private non-
profit community health centers funded under the migrant health
center, community health center, health care for the homeless, or
Medicare Part B programs, and certain Native American tribal
programs.242
FQHC Look-Alikes are health centers that meet the eligibility
requirements for the CHC Program, the MHC Program, or the
HCH Program, but do not actually receive funding from these pro-
grams.243 To receive Look-Alike status, a clinic must satisfy four
basic conditions. The clinic must: (1) demonstrate community
need; (2) deliver a range of primary health care and ancillary serv-
ices, including preventative care; (3) adhere to specific manage-
ment and finance criteria; and (4) follow community-based
governance requirements. 2" All FQHCs and FQHC Look-Alikes
receive partial or total reimbursement of reasonable costs for serv-
ices to Medicaid245 and Medicare patients.246 In addition, the
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id. at 10.
238. Id.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 256 (1994).
240. Id.
241. The George Washington University National Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief
No. 613, Access to Primary Care in Underserved Areas: Expanding Medicaid, Medi-
care, and Public Health Services Through the FQHC Program (Jan. 1993).
242. Id.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(4) (1994).
244. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, APPLICATION FOR DESIGNATION AS A FEDERALLY
QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u (1994).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1994).
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FQHC programs provide public health grants to give expanded pri-
mary care services to low-income uninsured persons.247
Rural Health Clinics Program
The Rural Health Clinics Program (RHC), the rural counterpart
to the FQHC program,248 promotes primary care to medically un-
derserved individuals. 24 9 Like FQHCs, RHCs receive reasonable
cost-based Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement. 250 However,
they receive reimbursement for only 80% of reasonable costs.25'
RHCs must provide certain primary care and diagnostic services,
meet a theshhold level of physician supervision, and make hospital
referral arrangements for the admission of individuals needing in-
patient care.252 As with FQHCs, federal regulations require RHCs
to locate in medically underserved areas.253 Unlike FQHCs, RHCs
are not bound by strict community-based governance standards.254
Hospital Clinics.
Hospital Clinics represent one means by which hospitals increase
the amount of primary health care they provide. Hospital clinics,
which have existed since the nineteenth century in voluntary hospi-
tals,255 originally served a charitable function.256 Today, some hos-
pitals continue to own and operate free clinics. For example, U.S.
Health Corporation, a Columbus, Ohio-based multihopsital sys-
tem, operates eleven free neighborhood clinics.257 In underserved
areas in the Salt Lake City area, Intermountain Health Care oper-
ates seven free clinics.25 8 The majority of hospital clinics, however,
require patients not covered by a third-party payer to pay for the
medical care they receive in accoidance with their means.259
247. The George Washington University National Health Policy Forum, supra note
241.
248. Id.
249. Id
250. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154.
251. 42 C.F.R. § 405.2425 (1991).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(aa)(2) (1994).
253. Id.
254. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154.
255. Such hospitals were created and financed by community leaders. Kovner,
supra note 145, at 163.
256. Mezey & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 129.
257. Jay Green, Systems' Charity Care Tells Only Part of Story, MoD. HEALTH-
CARE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 27.
258. Id.
259. Mezey & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 129.
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Clinic structures vary among hospitals. Clinics can be either
physically attached to a hospital or freestanding. Some hospitals
own and operate clinics. Others form partnerships with physician
groups or community health clinics. 260 Hospitals may also acquire
or form multiple partnerships, resulting in the creation of a primary
care network. 261 Finally, hospitals wishing to expand primary care
services without starting or acquiring clinics may sponsor the con-
version of an existing clinic to a Federally Qualified Health Clinic
or Rural Health Clinic. 262 Clinics originally received primary spon-
sorship from teaching hospitals and medical schools, but these in-
stitutions proved less successful in sponsoring community health
clinics than community-controlled corporations. By the mid 1970s,
community corporations became the sole sponsors of community
health clinics.263
Although community health centers and hospitals turned away
from each other as they began competing for patients, they are
now attempting to collaborate.26  For example, the Plainfield
Neighborhood Health Services Corporation, which operates the
Plainfield Health Center, and the Muhlenberg Regional Medical
Center, an acute-care regional teaching hospital, combined their
ambulatory services to eliminate wasteful duplication of medical
services and to give medical residents improved outpatient train-
ing.265 Hospitals administrators are also interested in developing
relationships with CHCIMHCs because they help relieve emer-
gency room overcrowding and provide primary care access points
for the hospitals, thereby serving to enlarge their patient bases.266
CHC/MHCs are interested in collaborating with hospitals because
hospitals generally possess better resources. Additionally, a hospi-
tal's close ties with physicians and other health care professionals
can aid in increasing the continuity of care provided to patients.267
260. Julane W. Miller & Susan Walmsley-Ault, The Hospital-Health Center Collab-
orative: A Model for Ambulatory Care, J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Oct. 1990, at
22.
261. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154.
262. Id.
263. Zuvekas, supra note 215, at 1-3.
264. Id. at 8.
265. Miller & Walnsley-Ault, supra note 260, at 22.
266. Zuvekas, supra note 215, at 8-9.
267. Id. at 9.
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Some hospitals, generally public hospitals,2 68 are pioneers in the
creation of clinical networks. The Parkland Hospital in Dallas,
Texas operates a nationally recognized example of such a network.
In the late 1980s, Parkland, a public teaching hospital, faced the
same emergency room problems as other hospitals across the coun-
try. In an effort to curb emergency room use and give its patient
population more comprehensive primary care, Parkland intro-
duced a Community Oriented Primary Care (COPC) program in
1989.69 The COPC program, which includes nine clinics,27 ° offers
primary care and comprehensive support services, including labo-
ratory, pharmacy, dental, and radiology services.2 71 The COPC
program attempts to meet the needs of its community by delivering
primary care at the neighborhood level.272
According to one expert, Parkland's philosophy centers on
building a health care system that assumes responsibility for a de-
fined population, focusing on patients in terms of primary and pre-
ventive care and public health. 73 Parkland's COPC program
remains committed to targeting its services to the community's
needs through a formal needs assessment program.274 This pro-
gram examines city, county, and state health data to determine the
community's greatest health risks. 275 The community-oriented pro-
grams implemented by Parkland include a sudden infant death
center, which provides counseling for parents; "Project First Step,"
which follows low-weight babies for five years; and the "Lifespan"
program, which teaches teenage mothers about prenatal and ma-
ternal care, parenting, and the importance of education. 76
Observers have concluded that Parkland's COPC program rep-
resents a successful model. Before the program started, three-
fourths of its patients had never been involved in any form of pri-
mary health care. 77 Emergency room visits have dropped 60,000 a
268. See John Bums, Caring for the Community: Hospital Programs Provide a Life-
line for the Inner Cities, But Only a Few Are To Be Found, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov.
8, 1993, at 30.
269. Ellen Sweets, Community-Based Health Programs: Dallas: Series: The We Dec-
ade: Rebirth of Community, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1995, at IC.
270. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154.
271. Koska, supra note 141, at 26.
272. Anderson, supra note 156, at 34.
273. Renee Blankenau, Caring for the Poor-and More; Public Hospitals Prepare
for a Changed Delivery System, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1993, at 42.
274. Koska, supra note 141, at 25.
275. Id.
276. Renee Blankenau, Foster G. McGaw Awards: Defining and Solving Commu-
nity Problems, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, July 5, 1994, at 92.
277. Id.
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year from a decade ago.278 In addition, asthma, diabetes, and hy-
pertension hospital visits have decreased.2 79 Although the hospital
invested significant funds to start the COPC program, administra-
tors have concluded that this investment will save them money in
the future.28 ° Parkland is not the dominant model of hospital care,
but it serves as a successful model and has attracted national atten-
tion.28' The Parkland model will likely be one example of the fu-
ture structure of hospitals and the care they will provide.
Although successful community health care programs improve
public health, reduce the need for expensive services, extend in-
patient services, and alleviate emergency room overcrowding, few
private hospitals operate such programs, leaving the task to public
hospitals.282 According to one public hospital administrator,
"[a]lthough organizations such as the American Hospital Associa-
tion constantly discuss the development of community care net-
works, very few not-for-profit hospital systems are developing
them."28 3
For-Profit Clinics
The term "for-profit clinic" refers to two types of clinics: ambula-
tory care centers and ambulatory surgical care centers. Ambula-
tory care centers (ACCs) began as emergency centers for patients
with non-life threatening conditions.284 These include two types of
facilities. The first type, an urgi-center or walk-in clinic, is usually
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. Burns, supra note 268, at 30.
283. Id. In an effort to increase their patient bases, hospitals are also investing in
ambulatory care centers, including urgi-care, emergi-care, and surgi-care centers.
Physician ownership of these centers is decreasing, and hospital ownership is increas-
ing. Joyce Riffer, Hospitals Becoming Driving Force in ACC Market, 60 Hosp. &
HEALTH NETWORKS 67 (1986). The increase in hospital ownership results from the
desire of hospitals to integrate their services vertically, thereby increasing their pa-
tient bases through a feeder system. Id.
To control the flow of patients in emergency departments, hospitals have adopted
triaging programs. Murphy & Murphy, supra note 154. Through triage, the condition
of each patient is evaluated and classified as emergent or non-emergent. Id. If the
patient is non-emergent, he or she is redirected to outpatient services, another hospi-
tal, or a freestanding clinic. Id. The patient obtains appropriate care while leaving
the emergency room free for emergent patients. Despite this advantage, triage only
redirects patients. Unlike clinic networks, triage fails to establish a continuum of
care, providing only episodic care. Id.
284. Anthony Birritteri, Ambulatory Care Centers: Expeditious Medical Service, 39
N.J. Bus., Feb. 1993, at 16.
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open seven days a week, twelve hours a day. The second type, an
emergi-center, receives patients twenty-four hours a day, 365 days
a year.285
The number of ACCs in the United States' health care delivery
system is growing rapidly. In 1993, there were an estimated 5,492
ACCs in the United States, a 32% increase from the previous
year.286 ACCs are attractive to patients because they are open long
hours, generally do not require appointments, and usually do not
have long waiting periods.287 ACCs emphasize service, making pa-
tient satisfaction a high priority.288 In addition, ACCs, which usu-
ally operate as for-profit institutions, have lower costs than hospital
emergency rooms, due in part to the fact that they do not inflate
paying patients' prices to compensate for the care the hospital pro-
vides indigent patients.289 In 1993, the average cost for a visit to an
ambulatory care center was $60.290 Although ACCs began as an
option for injured individuals not in need of a hospital emergency
department, they have since expanded into other areas such as pri-
mary care, pediatrics, orthopedics, employee health, cancer treat-
ment, diagnostic imaging, physical therapy, and other medical
specialties.291 Some centers deal exclusively in specialty treatment
such as dialysis and cancer treatment.292
ACCs generally require payment or proof of worker's compen-
sation eligibility at the time services are rendered.293 However, pa-
285. Suzanne B. Cashman et al., Investor-Owned Ambulatory Care Walk-in Centers:
How Have Primary Care Physicians Responded?, 11 J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING 61
(1991).
286. John Bums, Outpatient Care Growing Both in Numbers, Scope, MoD.
HEALTHCARE, May 23, 1994, at 81.
287. Barbara Bigelow, Ambulatory Care Centers: Are They a Competitive Advan-
tage?, 36 HosP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 351 (1991).
288. Cashman et al., supra note 285, at 61.
289. Birritteri, supra note 284, at 16.
290. Id. Costs ranged between $38 and $100. Id.
291. John Baronowski, Labs in Ambulatory Care Centers: Medicine's Growth Sec-
tor, 17 MED. LABORATORY OBSERVER 26 (1985); Bums, supra note 286, at 81; COM-
MITTEE ON IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE, FOR-
PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 37 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE].
292. See COMMITrEE, supra note 291, at 38; Arnold S. Relman, The Health Care
Industry: Where Is It Taking Us?, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 854, 855 (1991); Michael A.
Romansky & Diane S. Millman, Legal, Regulatory, and Reimbursement Issues Affect-
ing Ambulatory Health Care Providers: Surgicenters, Diagnostic Centers, Radiation
Therapy Centers, and Clinical Labs, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, 171, 175 (Alice G.
Gosfield ed., 1989).
293. COMMITTEE, supra note 291, at 106.
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tients can receive reimbursement from third-party payers,
depending on the individual's health care policy.294
Originally only physicians owned ACCs.295 Now, ownership of
ACCs is divided among physicians, hospitals or hospital systems,
and for-profit corporations. 296 Hospital-owned centers comprise
the fastest growing segment of the ACC industry.2 97 Although not-
for-profit hospitals operate them, most centers are run as for-profit
enterprises. 298 Hospitals open ACCs to retain patients and in-
crease revenues, although some studies indicate there is no proof
that ACCs accomplish either of these goals.299
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASCs) perform surgical proce-
dures that do not require an overnight stay.300 Ambulatory surgery
grew rapidly in the 1980s because of three developments: new tech-
nologies made more outpatient surgery possible; third-party payers
encouraged use of them; and patients found ASCs more conve-
nient.30 1 As of 1993, there were an estimated 1,862 ambulatory sur-
gery centers in the United States. Seventy-seven percent were
independent, seventeen percent were corporate-owned, and six
percent were hospital-owned. 0 2 Like ACCs, almost all ASCs are
run as for-profit enterprises. 3  Corporate chains with multiple fa-
cilities represent the fastest growing section of ambulatory surgical
centers.30 4
Although freestanding ambulatory facilities provide many bene-
fits, they present two significant problems. The first problem is
quality assurance. Public regulation of freestanding centers, which
are generally not subject to the same standards as hospitals, varies
greatly from state to state and is extremely limited in some cases.30 5
The second problem is fragmentation of care. Because freestand-
294. Brenda L. Becker, Ambulatory Care Centers: Off and Running, 15 MED. LAB-
ORATORY OBSERVER 39, 40 (1983).
295. COMMITTEE, supra note 291, at 36-37.
296. Id. at 37.
297. Bigelow, supra note 287, at 353.
298. COMMITTEE, supra note 291, at 38.
299. See Bigelow, supra note 287, at 352.
300. COMMITTEE, supra note 291, at 35.
301. Irene Fraser, Healthcare Policy: Ambulatory Care and Healthcare Reform, 2
ANNALS OF HEALTHLAW 215, 219 (1993).
302. Harris Meyer, Hospitals Respond By Expanding Outside Care: Ambulatory
Care and Home Health Centers, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 9, 1995, at 38.
303. COMMITTEE, supra note 292, at 37.
304. Meyer, supra note 302, at 34.
305. Fraser, supra note 301, at 222.
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ing centers specialize in certain types of care, the treatment of pa-
tients can become fragmented and lack continuity.30
6
III. Strengthening Community-Based Health Care
This part begins by developing the rationale for a decentralized,
"bottom-up" community-based approach to health care. It then
discusses two specific implementation strategies: encouraging
volunteerism and community-based models for reforming health
care.
Rationale for Community-Based Health Care
Alienation and loneliness characterize late twentieth century
America. Making our institutions smaller and more comprehensi-
ble may not only facilitate their revitalization but also provide af-
fordable preventive and primary health care, especially for the
uninsured and underinsured. In the future, people may want to
assume a greater degree of control over their lives, rather than
leaving key decisions and their implementation to far removed,
nameless, faceless legislators and bureaucrats. Citizenship and
public involvement, through participation and empowerment, mat-
ter. Participation connotes more people taking control over their
lives, taking charge and organizing for themselves. Participation is
based on the premise that no one has the right to make decisions
affecting an individual without that person taking part in the deci-
sion-making process. Involvement in decision-making also serves
to promote human developments. Focusing on community-based
health care will enable each person to see the need for an active
role in society where each person's actions have meaning and im-
pact. Smaller political units, which characterize a decentralized ap-
proach to health care, are less complex and therefore more
comprehensible.
Beyond recognizing that citizenship matters and encouraging a
higher degree of participation in local institutions, the implementa-
tion of community-based health care serves another, more prag-
matic, goal. Decentralization would encourage localities to
experiment with various techniques designed to meet the nation's
health care crisis. We next consider two community-based health
care strategies: (1) encouraging volunteerism and (2) reforming
health care at the local level.
306. Id.
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Encouraging Volunteerism
Introduction
With spiraling medical costs, limited access to health care, and
millions of uninsured Americans, we need to devise solutions.
Although many people argue that radical change of our health care
system is necessary, almost everyone agrees that the quality of our
health care system is among the best in the world. Most agree that
we need to devise programs that will allow everyone in our society
access to quality medical care without causing our government to
go bankrupt or the quality of our medical care to deteriorate. One
solution that some doctors propose is to implement a mandatory
national health service program whereby doctors are required to
give time serving the poor in order to obtain a license in any juris-
diction. Another solution is to encourage non-mandatory
volunteerism as a means of staffing free clinics.
Mandatory Volunteerism
One controversial solution to help alleviate the national health
care problem focuses on requiring physicians to give their services
to the poor or indigent population as a condition for licensing.
Several different proposals have been suggested.
American Medical Association's Position
The proposal put forth to the American Medical Association was
premised on the notion that physicians have historically devoted
much of their practices to uncompensated care.3 °7 Actually, as far
back as 1846, the American Medical Association's original Code of
Ethics stated that "to individuals in indigent circumstances, profes-
sional services should be cheerfully and freely accorded. ' 30 8 In
fact, according to an AMA survey conducted in 1994 to determine
the extent of charity care by physicians, 67.7% of U.S. doctors pro-
vide some amount of care to patients without charge or at reduced
fees.30 9 In contrast, a survey conducted in 1988 showed that only
62% of physicians were providing charity care at that time. 310 At
least in part, this increase in charity care is thought to be the result
307. See AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Caring for the Poor, 269
JAMA 2533 (1993).
308. George D. Lundberg & Laurence Bodine, 50 Hours for the Poor, 73 A.B.A. J.
55 (1987).
309. MARTIN L. GONZALEZ, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 1995 at 11 (1995).
310. Id. at 12.
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of an increase in the number of uninsured. 31' The survey also
found that physicians are giving more time each week to charity
care. In 1994, they gave 7.2 hours a week, or 12.4% of working
hours, to charity care, compared to 6.5 hours, or 10.6% of their
total practice time in 1990.312 The dollar value of the charity care
donated by physicians in 1994 amounted to a staggering $11.3
billion.313
Although these numbers are impressive, the survey does not ad-
dress why one-third of physicians do not provide any charity care
despite widespread public attention to'the need for such services.314
The AMA president, Robert McAffee, M.D., said, "For many pa-
tients charity care is their only means of obtaining necessary medi-
cal care. And, until significant reform is achieved, it remains a
critical part of health care delivery. '315 The AMA president went
on to describe his own charity care as a surgeon as "a routine part
of my ethical responsibility to the community. '' 316 This statement
leads to the question of how can we get all (or at least more) physi-
cians to feel that it is their ethical responsibility to provide charity
care?
One proposal to the AMA in 1992 attempted to answer the
question by requiring physicians to devote 10% of their income or
fifty hours a year to care for the indigent. 317 This proposal was
rejected. However, in 1990, the AMA's Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs included the following statement in its Fundamen-
tal Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship: "Physicians
should continue their traditional assumption of -a part of the re-
sponsibility for the medical care for those who cannot afford essen-
tial health care. ' 318 Many people believe that all doctors should,
"as a matter of ethics and good faith,... contribute a significant
percentage of their.total professional efforts without expectation of
financial renumeration. ' ' 319 However,' there remains reluctance to
require charity care as a matter of AMA policy. Although the pro-
posal to the AMA was probably rejected because of the common
311. J. Duncan Moore, Jr., Physicians Providing More Charity Care, Although 32%
Do None, AMA Survey Finds, MOD. HEALTH CARE, June 5, 1995, at 26.
312. Gonzalez, supra note 309, at 12.
313. Id. at 13.
314. Moore, supra note 311.
315. Id. -
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Lundberg & Bodine, supra note 308, at 55.
1997] 277
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
belief that charity care should be given out of concern and kindness
rather than forced upon physicians, another even more controver-
sial proposal has been suggested.
Mandatory Service as a Requirement for Graduating
Medical School
In a proposal contained in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, the author writes that the solution to the national
health care problem lies in incorporating national health service
into graduate medical education. 32 0 Two major problems with our
nation's health care system form the basis of this solution, namely,
the need for more generalists and the geographic concentration of
physicians.
First, there are far too many specialists in comparison to general
physicians.32 ' Currently, only about 2% of medical students
choose further education in areas of general practice, such as inter-
nal medicine, family practice, or pediatrics.322 The Council on
Graduate Medical Education and the Association of American
Medical Colleges have recommended that 50% of medical students
should receive further training as generalists.323 Possible solutions
for training more generalists include revising medical education,
restricting the number of postgraduate training residencies offered
in non-primary care specialties, and providing economic incentives
to induce more physicians-in-training to choose primary care as
their field of practice.32 4
Second, physicians often do not locate in the areas of greatest
need. Most affluent metropolitan areas have too many specialists,
while other areas lack even a single generalist. This second prob-
lem, of course, is far more difficult to solve. Even if we achieve a
better mix of physicians, it remains difficult to attract and keep
doctors in rural, inner-city, and other underserved areas.32 5 Physi-
cians want access to facilities, laboratories, and colleagues not
often found in these environments. Additionally, 80% of medical
students graduate with loans exceeding $55,000.326 This high debt
320. Michael M.E. Johns, Mandatory National Health Service: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 269 JAMA 3156 (1996).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Johns, supra note 320.
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causes young physicians to train for high-paying specialties and
stay in affluent areas.327
327. What is the best way to solve the problems of physician mix and distribution
and achieve the goal of universal access to health care? According to Dr. Michael
Johns, "the best way to get physicians into underserved areas is to expand the Na-
tional Health Service Corps and to incorporate national health service into graduate
medical education." He suggests the following structure:
After four years of medical school, followed by the normal one year internship, the
path of the physicians would divide into: (1) those pursuing generalist training, and
(2) those pursuing specialist training. For those pursuing generalist training, after
completion of their internship year they would spend two years of advanced general-
ist residency training. After completing this residency training, these physicians
would serve two years in the National Health Service at their earned, advanced level
of rank and pay. Upon completion of their service, they would receive a stipend
equivalent to the cost of three years of the cost of medical school.
For the group pursuing specialist training, after the internship year, their advanced
training would be delayed. They would go directly into national service for two years,
earning a salary comparable to a public health service officer. After completion of
their service, the members of this group would be able to apply for and pursue ad-
vanced specialist training. This group would receive a stipend at the end of their
service equivalent to only two years of the cost of medical school. For both groups,
however, debt repayment and interest accrual would be deferred during the period of
national health service.
The opportunity to pursue immediately advanced training and to receive a stipend
equal to the cost of medical school for only two years of service will provide an eco-
nomic incentive for medical student to pursue generalist training.
Dr. Johns argues that financing for this system exists. He figures that the cost of
paying 16,000 physicians per year in an expanded national health service would
amount to only about 0.1% of the estimated $1 trillion a year cost of health care in
two to three years (assuming an annual salary of $40,000). The nation would realize a
cost savings by discouraging unnecessary and costly specialized training, combined
with the health care dollars saved through proper distribution of preventive and pri-
mary care. According to Dr. Johns, this cost savings will more than offset the costs of
this revised system of graduate medical education.
Many physicians do not approve of Dr. Johns' proposal. The underlying concern is
that requiring medical students to perform national services restricts the student's
freedom of choice. Although it is true that the requirement of national service will
restrict young physicians for a brief time, the government imposes all types of require-
ments to help better serve the public welfare. In addition to the potential benefit
society will reap from a mandatory national service program, physicians will also ben-
efit. The physicians will not only receive paid on the job training, but will have their
loans virtually paid off by the time they are finished with their service. They will then
have more freedom in their career because they will not have the tremendous burden
of $50,000 indebtedness.
Another criticism of the program is that it will not provide quality care because
young, inexperienced physicians will be the care givers. However, care can be given
in teams with more experienced physicians working as captains. This system will pro-
vide top-quality care while simultaneously enhancing the training of the less exper-
ienced physicians.
Although this type of solution has tremendous potential to solve the access
problems of our nation's health care system, it will unlikely be implemented without
the widespread support of the medical community. Because physicians, along with
the members of any profession, will most likely be unwilling to accept proposals that
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
Non-Mandatory Volunteerism
Although requiring physicians to serve the poor as a matter of
policy has great potential to solve the access problems of our na-
tion's uninsured, it is necessary to consider alternatives that physi-
cians will more likely accept. One such solution is to encourage
non-mandatory volunteerism as a technique to staff free clinics
thereby enhancing community- based health care. But the ques-
tion remains how we can effectively accomplish this goal as a
means of resolving the national health care crisis. -
The AMA's Position
Perhaps the best resource our country can utilize is the large
population of retired and senior physicians. This group of doctors,
estimated at 55,000,328 has the experience, financial security, and
most importantly the willingness to contribute their time and serve
to their local communities. The AMA "supports and encourages
the utilization of retired and senior physicians who have main-
tained a required level of competence for the purpose of satisfying
the need for physicians in inner-city and rural areas. ' 32 9 The AMA
also supports the use of retired physicians to provide voluntary
medical care to indigent populations and employed individuals
who do not have medical coverage.33° Currently, expensive liabil-
ity insurance serves as the major stumbling block to utilizing re-
tired physicians who seek to volunteer. After conducting an
investigation, the AMA formulated the following recommenda-
tions to help encourage volunteerism by retired physicians:
(1).That the American Medical Association request that the fed-
eral government encourage volunteerism among physicians as
well as other professionals in law, .education, etc., and that in
doing so it would provide for the necessary liability waivers and
projections that would make it more attractive for volunteers to
serve.
will require members of their profession to perform services they might choose not to
do, it is necessary to consider more viable solutions. One solution may be to simply
make Dr. Johns' proposal voluntary instead of mandatory. The program would still
offer tremendous economic incentive for those wishing to participate, but will be
more likely to gain widespread approval. See Johns,supra note 320; Gary L. Brown et
al, Mandatory National Health Service, 270 JAMA 2805 (1993).
328. Fred Wurlitzer & Robert McCool, Liability Immunity for Physician Volun-
teers, 272 JAMA 31 (1994).
329. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES ACTION 95 (June 1995).
330. Id.
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(2) That the AMA request that the appropriate agency in the
federal government study and consider the feasibility of devel-
oping a National Retired Professionals Volunteer Public Service
Corps with professionals from many -disciplines.
(3) That the AMA, should the federal government establish a
National Retired Professional Volunteer Public Corps, lend its
support to medical associations and speciality societies in the
formulation of a Retired Professional Volunteer Public Service
Corps with professionals from many disciplines.
(4) That the AMA continue to encourage physicians to serve as
volunteers in their communities, and further that it continue ef-
forts to lobby for better protection for physicians against mal-
practice suits and immunity form professional liability for
senior, part-time and other physicians who volunteer their serv-
ices.
(5) That the AMA reaffirm [the policy], which encourages es-
tablishment of programs that will have appropriate levels of
government pay professional liability premiums or indemnify
physicians who deliver free services in free clinics or otherwise
provide free care to the indigent.131
The AMA's recommendations contain the recurring theme of or-
ganized volunteer programs with protection from liability for the
participants. Although the need for the protection from liability
appears evident, some groups consistently lobby against such meas-
ures for fear that the poor will be injured from inappropriate medi-
cal care without remedy.
Fortunately, states already use various forms of "Good Samari-
tan" laws and other mechanisms to protect volunteer physicians.332
By providing immunity from liability and negligence, Good Samar-
itan statutes encourage doctors to provide treatment voluntarily.
For instance, Massachusetts requires that licensed physicians
render medical services to a person experiencing a medical emer-
gency, whether or not the person is able to pay.333 The majority of
states, however, provide inadequate protection for volunteer
physicians.
The solution may lie in government-paid insurance premiums.
The doctors would be protected from personal liability without
paying for their own coverage while their patients would be able to
seek remedies in the event of malpractice. However, taxpayer dol-
331. Id. at 97.
332. Id.
333. See George Annas, Beyond the Good Samaritan: Should Doctors Be Required
to Provide Essential Services?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1977, at 16.
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lars will be needed to pay for the insurance premiums in a time of
consistent budget cutbacks. Overall, though, the cost savings from
providing preventive and primary care for only the cost of malprac-
tice insurance offers a tremendous benefit. Thus far, several states
have launched cost-saving programs through the passage of appro-
priate legislation, while other states struggle to do the same.
Protecting Volunteer Physicians From Liability Claims
More and more physicians today are retiring at younger ages.334
The most common explanation is the ever-increasing difficulty of
practicing medicine in the U.S. in the face of a rapidly changing
health care environment and rising professional liability claims.335
Of course, with more physicians retiring early, an underused re-
source has started to swell. Many of these physicians would like to
volunteer but are frustrated by the failure of their state legislatures
to pass legislation dealing with potential malpractice liability.
For instance, in Massachusetts a strong demand for more volun-
teer opportunities for physicians led the Massachusetts Medical So-
ciety to invite all 1,200 known retired physicians in the state to join
an organized community service campaign.336 The physicians re--
sponded with overwhelming concern; over half of them accepted
the invitation.337 Because many of the physicians no longer carried
malpractice ihsurance, the state needed to pass legislation to pro-
tect them from liability claims. Most thought this would not be a
difficult challenge as shielding these doctors from liability seemed
like a small price to pay for the service they sought to provide. The
Massachusetts Medical Society introduced legislation that would
have granted immunity from a professional liability action for ordi-
nary negligence to physicians who volunteer in underserved ar-
eas.338 The immunity would have been limited to their volunteer
activities. Although expectation for passage was high, opposition
"by the Massachusetts Association of Trial Attorneys and the Mas-
sachusetts Bar Association prevented the legislation from emerg-
ing out of committee. ' 339
334. Barry Manuel, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1994,
at A14.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Manuel, supra note 334, at A14.
COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE
State Initiatives
State legislation allowing physicians to volunteer without per-
sonal liability constraints have achieved a number of great suc-
cesses. Several successful programs have begun in Florida. One
program, run by the Senior Friendship Centers, Inc., operates in
four Florida counties. The center runs nonprofit volunteer clinics
which serve patients age 55 and older.340 Although many of the
patients are indigent or uninsured, none are ever turned away. The
clinics serve more than 10,000 patients a year with the help of over
100 volunteer physicians, mostly comprised of retirees.341
Florida law is a key factor in the center's success. Physicians
who retire in the state can obtain a special medical license to work
in nonprofit settings.342 More importantly, physicians and other
volunteers have strong personal liability protection when they pro-
vide care for the needy. Florida covers liability judgments through
a risk management trust fund.343 Another successful Florida pro-
gram, called We Care, operates in twelve Florida counties. Under
the We Care program, volunteer doctors and hospitals give free
medical and surgical care on a rotating basis to patients referred to
them. The care includes office visits, laboratory tests, and sur-
gery.344 Potential patients are screened; if they qualify they will
receive medical care free of charge.
In Marion County alone doctors and hospitals provided more
than $2 million of volunteer medical care in one year.345 Designed
to cut down on expensive and unnecessary trips to the emergency
room, the program provides access to primary and preventive care
for the uninsured and the indigent.346 The cost to the county con-
stituted only a fraction of the value of the service provided. Flor-
ida offers just one example of the benefits a state realizes by
encouraging volunteerism.
Washington and Kentucky have adopted similar measures that
set up state subsidies for professional liability premiums for volun-
teer physicians.347 Virginia set precedent when it enacted a statute
340. Retired, But Not From Medicine, 38 AM. MED. NEWS 19 (Aug. 21, 1995).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Lesley Clark, We Care Program Offers Free Medical Help to Those in Need,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 28, 1995, at Lake Sentinel 5.
345. Richard T. Bosshardt, We Care Improves Medical Care Without Needless
Laws, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 1994, at Lake Sentinel 4.
346. Clark, supra note 344.
347. Manuel, supra note 334.
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in 1983 holding volunteers at free clinic throughout the state free
from malpractice liability unless they are grossly negligent.348 In
Missouri, a statutorily required legal expense fund protects health
care providers who volunteer at free clinics.3 49 Although more and
more states are following the trend to encourage volunteerism,
much work remains to be done at the state level.
Federal Initiatives
At the federal level, Senator Daniel Coats (R-Indiana) has intro-
duced legislation that would encourage the provision of medical
services in medically underserved communities by extending fed-
eral liability coverage to medical volunteers. Specifically, the bill
would require that a medical professional who provides health care
service to a medically underserved person without receiving com-
pensation be covered by the federal tort claims provisions for pur-
poses of any medical malpractice claim arising in connection with
the service.3 5 1 To qualify for this protection, the health care profes-
sional would be required to furnish the service without charge to
any person and to notify the recipient of care of the limited liabil-
ity. The legislation explicitly preempts inconsistent state laws.
However, it would not hamper state laws providing greater incen-
tives or protections.
In an effort to expand access to health care services to low-in-
come individuals, Kassebaum-Kennedy also includes a provision
designed to shield certain health care volunteers from malpractice
liability. Specifically, the law extends Federal Torts Claims Act
coverage to medical volunteers in free clinics by deeming such indi-
viduals to be employees of the U.S. Public Health Service.352
Health professionals must meet certain conditions to fall within
the protection of this provision. They must be licensed or certified
in accordance with applicable law, and they must be volunteers.
They may not receive compensation for the services in the form of
salary, fees, or third-party payments.353 Eligible health profession-
als must provide qualifying services at a free clinic or through free
348. VA. CODE ch. 1 § 54.1-106, § 32.1-127.3 (Michie 1983).
349. Health Care Measure, Other Laws Take Effect, KANSAS CITY STAR, Aug. 28,
1993, at C1.
350. S. 1217, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
351. Id.
352. 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) (added by of the Health Reform Act of 1996, § 194).
353. Id. Health professionals are not, however, barred from receiving reimburse-
ment from a clinic for reasonable expenses (e.g., transportation and supplies). The
free clinic may also receive a voluntary donation from a patient. Id.
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clinic programs or events. Health care professionals must provide
written notice of limited liability to patients. Free clinics must ap-
ply to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to have
each health care professional deemed a "free clinic health profes-
sional" covered by the new legislation. Finally, the legislative his-
tory indicates that the new provisions do not preempt state laws
that provide greater incentives or protections to health care
professionals.354
In addition to encouraging volunteerism, community-based
health care models exist. We turn next to consider these models
and the financial and legal issues they raise.
Models for Reforming Health Care at the State and Local Levels
Health care providers throughout the country have begun to de-
velop integrated delivery systems to gain a competitive edge in an
era in which all payers demand increased value for their health
care dollars. These new delivery systems are bringing together
many of the players in the health care system-private hospitals,
physician practices, outpatient providers-in an effort to market a
simpler, price competitive health care product. Although these ef-
forts ensure increased access and lower costs, they fail to address
the long term health care needs of the communities whom they
serve.
Alternatively, a community-based model for health care reform
shifts the emphasis from treating individuals at a lower cost to
treating communities and subpopulations. This is achieved, in part,
by examining and responding to population-based indicators of
health, such as mortality, and emphasizing both education and pre-
vention. Moreover, a community-based model emphasizes full co-
ordination of a community's health care resources, ongoing
community needs assessment, and heightened accountability stan-
dards. After analyzing an academic community health model, this
section considers a foundation-sponsored comprehensive commu-
nity health program and the San Diego County Medical Program.
Community Health Model
The key goals of a community-based health care model are: (1)
planning, which includes needs assessment, goal setting, evaluation,
354. Text of Conference Report, Joint Explanatory Statement of H.R. 3103, Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 4 Health Care Policy Rep.
(BNA) S-73 (Aug. 5, 1996).
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and accountability; (2) intensive participation by the population
served; (3) full integration of multiple public and private funding
resources; and (4) integration of services and active coordination
with other community resources. Although federal funding of ru-
ral and community health centers achieves integration of funding
resources, 355 it fails to meet the other key goals of a community-
based health care model.
Several theorists have offered proposals designed to meet the
goals of a community-based health care model, and some commu-
nities have achieved success with such programs. These proposals
provide important insight into the potential strengths and weak-
nesses of a community based approach to health care reform.
Professor Steven Shortell, of Northwestern University's J.L. Kel-
logg Graduate School of Management, has proposed the creation
of health promotion and accountability regions (HPARs). 6 Ac-
cording to Shortell, the HPARs would serve as a public-private
partnership providing much needed incentives, focus, and organi-
zation to health care reform efforts.357 Under Shortell's proposal,
state legislatures would create HPARs, which would serve as the
focus of development and implementation of health care policy.
The state department of health would appoint representatives of
hospitals, physicians, insurers, employers, labor, government, and
consumers to a governing board.358 An executive director assisted
by a technical staff trained in clinical epidemiology, statistics, plan-
ning and evaluation, and relevant social science disciplines would
report to the governing board.359
HPARs would assume responsibility for assessing community
needs, establishing health care goals, determining premiums, allo-
cating resources, and setting budgets necessary to meet those goals,
contracting with health care plans to deliver services, and holding
health plans accountable according to predetermined performance
criteria. In meeting these responsibilities, HPARs would assess
community needs and establish a corresponding benefit package.360
Provided they operated within their HPAR's policies, health plans
355. See supra notes 248-307 and accompanying text.
356. Stephen M. Shortell, A Model for State Health Care Reform, 11 HEALTH AF-
FAIRS 108 (1992).
357. Id. at 124.
358. Id. at 109.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 110.
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would be free to develop innovative approaches to providing cost-
effective, high-quality care to its enrollees.36'
Shortell foresees various funding sources for the benefit package
an HPAR would offer. However, these funding sources would be
anchored to traditional employment-based health insurance.362
Copayments and deductibles would continue to be used.363 Indi-
viduals not covered by employment-based health insurance would
be covered through a state health plan financed with revenues de-
riving from targeted user taxes (e.g ., alcohol and tobacco) and
general taxes. 364 The benefit package available to HPAR partici-
pants would be the same, regardless of the source of funding. All
insurers doing business within the state would be required to offer
the benefit package at or below established premiums.365 Because
the HPAR would risk-rate premiums in advance, insurers would
have no need to avoid risk by excluding less healthy person.
Based on the region's health needs and available resources, the
HPAR would establish a health care budget for each year. This
budget would represent a locally determined expenditure cap re-
flecting the region's mission and health care objectives.366
Although the financing mechanism for the HPAR budget would
follow the play-or-pay model,367 it differs by focusing on both local
determination of needs, benefits and premiums, and its emphasis
on community health objectives (as opposed to purely economic
objectives). Shortell suggests that large states would have several
HPARs, while small states may have only one.368 However, the
HPAR model can be adapted to serve even smaller populations.
Moreover, the HPAR model could be modified to allow for further
integration of federal, state, and local sources of funding.
Kellogg Initiative
The Comprehensive Community Health Models (CCHM) initia-
tive represents a partnership between the W.K. Kellogg Founda-
361. Id.
362. Shortell, supra note 356, at 111.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 112.
366. Id.
367. Under the play-or-pay model, employers would be required to provide health
insurance coverage to their employees or contribute to a public plan. Id. at 111.
368. Shortell, supra note 356, at 109.
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tion and three Michigan counties.3 69 The Kellogg Foundation
contributes financial and technological resources to help communi-
ties bring payers, providers, and consumers together to assess and
reform local health systems.3 70 The program is designed to assist
communities in building a more efficient and effective health care
system by strengthening local control and restructuring how serv-
ices are delivered. Specifically, the program helps communities:
(1) assess and prioritize community health needs; (2) redefine
health local visioning process; (3) develop a community-driven,
comprehensive plan to provide basic care to all residents; and (4)
provide community governance for implementation and
management.371
The CCHM initiative is based on the Kellogg Foundation's expe-
rience with over 100 community-based health care projects.3 72 The
experience indicated that a community's health care delivery sys-
tem must: (1) be managed by the community so that it reflects the
community's needs and priorities; (2) maintain and improve the
health status of people by reducing their morbidity and increasing
their length of life through health promotion, primary prevention,
and primary care; and (3) minimize the impact and costs of an in-
jury, acute illness, or chronic illness through early diagnosis and
treatment. 3
73
According to program officials, when a community manages its
health care resources with an understanding of the nature of its
health care problems, the way its providers perform, and the finan-
cial limitations of its payers, it can establish priorities and develop
programs that expand access, control costs, improve quality, and
maximize program satisfaction.374 To help communities achieve
these goals, the CCHM initiative envisions: (1) establishing a com-
munity governing board; (2) creating an integrated administrative
structure; (3) expanding community-wide coverage; (4) developing
a comprehensive integrated delivery system; and (5) designing a
health information system. 75
369. Pamela A. Paul-Shaheen, Health Care Reform-A Community-based Alterna-
tive: The Comprehensive Community Health Models Initiative, MICH. MED. 57 (Oct.
1994).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY HEALTH MODELS OF MICHIGAN, AN IN-DEPTH
LOOK AT CCHM 2-3 (1994).
374. Id. at 3.
375. Paul-Sheehan, supra note 369, at 58.
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San Diego as a Model for Change
The San Diego County Medical (CMS) Program is an innovative
public/private partnership providing health care services to medi-
cally indigent adults. Through a coordinated system involving San
Diego County, a private sector manager, and private sector provid-
ers, the CMS Program provides emergency services, in-patient
services, speciality and primary care, and related ancillary services
to more than 25,000 individuals. 6
History of the San Diego Indigent Care Program
Prior to 1983, medically indigent persons in the State of Califor-
nia received health care services through Medi-Cal, the California
Medicaid program.377 When California passed the Medi-Cal Re-
form Act of 1982, however, the responsibility of providing health
care to these persons shifted from the state to the counties. 378 Be-
cause San Diego County did not have any public hospitals, it de-
cided to contract with other organizations to provide care to the
medically indigent.379 Initially, the county contracted with four or-
ganizations, each responsible for patient care in a certain geo-
graphical area.38° Medicus Systems was hired to administer and to
oversee the entire program.38' Medicus Systems continues to ad-
minister the CMS Program.382 Its responsibilities have included in-
stituting a quality assurance program throughout the county,
retrieving, analyzing and reporting program utilization and finan-
cial information, and establishing program policies and
procedures. 383
Problems With the Original Program
Four problems plagued the original CMS Program: barriers to
access, cost-shifting, varying payment practices, and inconsistent
management policies. Access constituted the most serious prob-
376. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, COUNTY MEDICAL SERVICES ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (1995).
377. Letter from Robert K. Ross, M.D., Director, County of San Diego Depart-
ment of Health Services, to Leonard E. Klein, Research Librarian, The George Wash-
ington University Law School 2 (Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with author).
378. Ron Threatt, The San Diego County Medical Services Program, 38 HENRY
FORD Hosp. MED. J. 114 (1990).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 115.
382. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 5.
383. Threatt, supra note 378, at 115.
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lem.38 Under the original program, the four regional contractors
assumed the risk for all services.385 To limit their actual financial
risk, contractors may have limited patient access to services. As a
Medicus Systems official explained, "Utilization increased 41% in
five years. However, appropriations increased incrementally. Ar-
guably, in order to maintain profitability, access [was] denied. ''386
Cost-shifting also troubled the program. Under the original
CMS Program, patients entered the program through a clinic or a
hospital emergency room.387 Seeking to limit their financial risk,
regional contractors often failed to qualify eligible emergency
room patients.388 As a consequence, hospitals bore the costs of
providing care to individuals who were eligible for the CMS Pro-
gram but had not been qualified by the regional contractors. This
resulted in ill will towards the program and uncollectible debts for
the hospitals.389
The original CMS Program also lacked sufficient control over
provider payments. The four regional contractors had the author-
ity to contract with providers, including hospitals, clinics, and phy-
sicians, at varying rates. 9 ° The resulting lack of uniformity among
reimbursement rates caused providers confusion and dissatisfac-
tion with the CMS Program.391 Finally, inconsistent care manage-
ment policies vexed the CMS Program in its early years. Each
individual contractor had a unique style of managing indigent pa-
tients' access to the health care system.392 As a result, management
of care techniques varied within the four regions. 93
As one Medicus official explained, the regionalized, decentral-
ized CMS Program mirrored the Medicaid program to the extent
that program policies were centrally formulated but regionally exe-
cuted, resulting in varying levels of access, service, and reimburse-
ment.394 This frustrated the CMS Program and left it unprepared
384. Id. at 116.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Threatt, supra note 378, at 115.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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to handle a growth in the number of individuals receiving care cou-
pled with a rapid decrease in financial resources.395
Solutions to the Early Problems
In 1989, San Diego County dismantled the original CMS Pro-
gram and implemented the current centrally-administered, county-
wide program.396 Under this program, the four regional contrac-
tors have been replaced by the CMS Program's Department of
Community Services.397 CMS bears budget, policy, contract ad-
ministration, and patient eligibility responsibilities. Centralization
of these duties reduces duplication of services and resources. The
day-to-day management functions lie with Medicus Systems, which
continues to administer the program.398  To address certain
problems associated with indigent patient managed care, especially
inconsistent reimbursement levels, the revised CMS Program reim-
burses its providers from three funding pools. 399 The three pools
are: the primary care reimbursement pool, the institutional services
reimbursement pool, and the specialty/ancillary reimbursement
pool.400 Each reimbursement pool encourages cost-effective be-
havior. Specifically, because each pool contains a fixed dollar
amount, over-utilization results in a lower reimbursement rate for
providers.4 0 If, however, funds remain at the end of the year,
providers share them.40 2
Primary care clinics receive monthly prospective payments based
on expected visits and supplemental charges. 40 3 Payments are eval-
uated and restructured three times annually and reconciled at the
end of each year.40 4 The final reimbursement value of a clinic visit
is determined at the end of the fiscal year based on the total
number of clinic visits and other expenses reimbursed from the
pool.40 5 For fiscal year 1995, the primary care risk pool was funded
395. See MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, CMS PROGRAM: OPERATIONS OVER-
VIEW 14 (1995).
396. Id.
397. Threatt, supra note 378, at 116.
398. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 14.
399. Threatt, supra note 378, at 116.
400. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH SERVICES: COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 270-71 (1995).
401. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 9.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 271.
404. Id.
405. Letter from Robert K. Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein, supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
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at $4.5 million.4 °6 The institutional services reimbursement pool
pays hospital and emergency department physicians for services
provided to patients during an acute in-patient stay or an emer-
gency department visit.4 °7 Hospitals receive monthly prospective
payments for their services based on historical utilization.0 8 Pay-
ments are adjusted .to reflect actual claims submitted by hospitals.
For fiscal year 1995, the institutional services risk pool was funded
at $7.3 million.40 9
The specialty/ancillary reimbursement pool reimburses physi-
cians and ancillary service providers for in-patient- physician, out-
patient physician, and outpatient specialty ancillary' services. 10
Physicians and ancillary providers are reimbursed on a fee-for-ser-
vice basis.41" ' The Medi-Cal fee schedule provides interim reim-
bursement rates that are adjusted to reflect utilization and
available funds.412 For fiscal year 1995, the specialty/ancillary risk
pool was funded at $12.8 million.413
Current San Diego Program
San Diego County's CMS Program incorporates elements neces-
sary for the success of any indigent care program. Through a sys-
tem of managed care, the program attempts to combat deficiencies
that plague the poorest patients, such as inadequate access to care,
overuse of emergency rooms, insufficient preventive care, and
meager methods of measuring quality.4"4
Most potentially eligible patients enter the CMS system because
they require immediate medical attention.41 5 The CMS Program is
made available to patients at emergency rooms, hospital admission
departments, and community clinics.41 6 Potentially eligible persons
are given applications and undergo face-to-face interviews and ver-
406. PUBLIc ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 270.
407. Letter from Robert K. Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein,'supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
408. Id.
409. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 270.
410. Letter from Robert K. Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein, supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
411. PUBLIc ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 271.
412. Letter from Robert K. Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein, supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
413. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 270.
414. Jeannie Mandelker, Government Purchasers See Value in Managed Care, 11
Bus. & HEALTH 40 (1993).
415. Letter from Robert K Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein, supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
416. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 7.
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ification processes to *ensure compliance with eligibility
requirements.4 17
The CMS Program employs a managed care approach to coordi-
nate the delivery of services to patients at the most appropriate and
cost-effective level of care. 18 Care is actively managed through an
innovative medical-social case management approach.4 19 To con-
trol utilization and to assure timely access to services, patients ar-
range for their own primary care through an extensive network of
clinics.4 20 Accessto specialty and ancillary care, however, is con-
trolled by Medicus by means of prior authorization procedures and
a system of referrals. 2'
In addition, a patient may be assigned to a CMS case manager to
assist the patient with special medical and social needs including:
homelessness, chronic illness, high medical needs, potential eligibil-
ity for other public programs, and appropriate transition to a less
intensive form of care.422 The case manager assesses the patient's
needs, plans and coordinates the delivery of services to meet those
needs, and evaluates and monitors services.423 Case management
serves as an important cost-containment tool. CMS claims that
case management has helped reduce the number of hospital admis-
sions and decrease the average length of hospitals stays, resulting
in substantial savings to the program, which spends nearly $369 per
day on every hospitalized patient. 24
Patient Characteristics
To qualify for the CMS Program, individuals must be medically
needy and ineligible for Medi-Cal 25 In addition, individuals must
be 21 through 64 years of age, a U.S. citizen, San Diego County
residents, have limited property and resources, and meet CMS Pro-
gram income limits.42 6 According to program officials, two-thirds
of the nearly 70,000 CMS applicants meet. these eligibility require-
417. Id.
418. Letter from Robert K Ross, M.D., to Leonard E. Klein, supra note 377, CMS
attachment.
419. Id.
420. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 7.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 8.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 395, at 17. To be eligible for
Medi-Cal, individuals must be blind, aged, disabled, or eligible for AFDC. Id.
426. Id. CMS Program income limits currently coincide with Medi-Cal financial
guidelines. Id.
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ments and receive program approval.427 CMS patients fall into two
major groups: young men aged 21-39 who enter the program as a
result of trauma injuries, and older women aged 50-64 who receive
services for chronic and acute illnesses, including diabetes, gastro-
intestinal disorders, and cancer.428
Services and Providers
Through the CMS Program, qualified patients receive primary,
emergency, and in-patient care, pharmaceuticals, durable medical
equipment, selected social support services, emergency dental care,
home health care, physical and occupational therapy, and ambu-
lance services.429 The program does not cover routine physical ex-
ams, pregnancy, family planning, and infertility. Services for
alcoholism, services for drug addiction, orthodontia, and organ,
limb and bone marrow transplants also are excluded.43 °
Private providers furnish care to CMS patients. Specifically, fif-
teen hospitals, eighteen clinics, and approximately 2,000 physician
and ancillary service providers participate in the CMS Program.43'
Experts consider these private providers as central to the success of
the CMS Program because they do not face the same challenges as
public entities. For example, hospitals and clinics can raise funds
from a variety of sources. 432 As the executive director of one clinic
explained, "The clinics hustle [for funding], no doubt about it."'433
Program Administration
Medicus Systems has served as the CMS Program administrator
since its inception. 34 Today, its responsibilities include serving as
the program's fiscal intermediary, managing provider reimburse-
ment pools, and preauthorizing specialty and ancillary care.435 In
addition, Medicus processes all claims, collects and analyzes finan-
cial and quality outcome data, manages utilization review re-
427. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 16.
428. Id. at 10.
429. Id. at 4.
430. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 269.
431. MEDICUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, supra note 376, at 17.
432. John J. Goldman & Tony Perry, Streamlined Approach Key to San Diego
Health System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at Al.
433. Id.
434. See supra notes 397-402 and accompanying text.
435. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 270-71.
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sources, and handles patient grievances.436 In 1995, Medicus
received $2.9 million for its services. 437
Success of the CMS Program
The CMS Program has achieved notable success. In its first ten
years of operation the program had saved San Diego County more
than $160 million in health care costs. 438 Savings can be attributed
in part to the medical and social case management program
adopted in 1989. Through case management techniques, the CMS
Program has reduced the ratio of outpatient treatments to hospital
admissions from 19:1 in 1990, to 15:1 in 1992.439 In addition, case
management techniques have enabled the program to decrease the
length of hospital stays. In 1994, the CMS Program had an average
hospital stay of 5.3 days compared to the national average of 8.5
days.4 40 By reducing both the number and the length of costly hos-
pital stays, the CMS Program has realized significant savings.
The privatization of health care services has also yielded signifi-
cant savings. According to Dr. Robert K. Ross, director of San
Diego County's health services, the advantages of privatization
have manifested themselves in four ways: (1) private entities
stretch dollars farther than their public counterparts; (2) they make
better use of volunteers; (3) they raise their own money; and (4)
they avoid costly contract settlements with civil service employ-
ees."41 By making effective use of financial and human resources
and securing funds including local donations and foundation
grants, CMS providers deliver $1.4 0 of health care for every dollar
of county resources. 442
The CMS Program has effectively met the needs of the commu-
nity. For example, clinics, which are controlled by a board of local
ethnic, community, religious, business, and medical leaders, 4 3 tai-
lor their services to their neighborhoods. Doctors, nurses, and
other health care practitioners at one clinic speak Spanish, Hmong,
Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian, and are trained to provide
436. Id. at 271.
437. Id. at 270.
438. Mandelker, supra note 414, at 41. Savings are based on the per-patient cost of
care versus the per-patient cost of care for Medi-Cal patients. Id.
439. Id. at 42.
440. Threatt, supra note 378, at 116.
441. James 0. Goldsborough, Los Angeles Pays for Waiting Too Long, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Aug. 28, 1995, at B7.
442. Joel Kotkin, Privatizing Health Care for the Poor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1995,
at A12.
443. Id.
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culturally sensitive and personalized service.'" As a result, the
clinic is equipped to assess community health care needs and to
devise ways to meet those needs in a cost-effective manner.1 5
Limitations of the CMS Program
The major limitations of the San Diego CMS Program stem from
a lack of funds. Cuts in funding have forced the program to tighten
eligibility criteria, leaving many working poor outside the pro-
gram. 46 In 1993, for example, in the face of budget constraints the
program excluded undocumented aliens, saving an estimated $7.5
million annually." 7 Experts also predict that if funds available for
the program continue to be insufficient to meet demand, provider
reimbursement rates may be reduced to such a level that providers
will refuse to participate in the program.4 48
Currently, a lack of exteinal methods for measuring medical out-
comes also hampers the CMS Program." 9 Experts believe that the
development of a mechanism to provide medical oversight of the
program by those with medical or nursing backgrounds would ad-
dress this problem.450
Implementing a CMS-Type Program in Other Cities
The implementation of a CMS-type approach to providing
health care to indigent populations would impact greatly the tradi-
tional role of counties.4 5 1 Currently, counties often serve as a pro-
vider of last resort, serving those who have no alternatives means
of securing health care. 52 Consequently, county hospitals typically
bear the burden of caring for the poor, who are easily forgotten by
the public and political bodies. In San Diego, however, the county
only arranges for indigent health care services, it does not provide
care directly.
As brokers of care, San Diego and other California counties (e.g
Orange County, California) have succeeded in savings large sums
of money while simultaneously providing a safety net for low-in-
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Jack Cheevers, Privatizing Hospitals: A Simple Cure?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17,
1995, at Al.
447. Id.
448. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., supra note 400, at 273.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Bruce Bronzan, The Revolution in Health Care, CAL. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at 18, 22.
452. Id.
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come individuals. 53 Whether other counties have the ability to
emulate these programs remains unclear. For example, Los Ange-
les is under immense pressure to privatize its public health sys-
tem.454 Opponents argue, however, that privatization would not
work in Los Angeles, which has the nation's highest rate of unin-
surance.455 They claim that outside providers are likely to save
money by turning indigent individuals away and reducing staffing
levels.456 Critics also fear that-private hospitals may be unwilling to
serve injured gang members, homeless persons, and substance
abusers.457 Nevertheless, privatization remains a viable option for
Los Angeles and other counties struggling with ensuring health
care for indigent populations.
Policy makers interested in implementing a community-based
death care system in other localities must consider two key ques-
tions, namely, the need to obtain financing for community based
health care and legal issues affecting local reform efforts.
Obtaining Financing for Community-Based Health
care Programs
Analysis of the financing options for community-based health
care programs turns on raising revenues or curtailing costs. This
section considers three topics, namely, state and local taxing
power, public-private funding options, and cost containment
schemes.
State and Local Taxing Power
The authority of the states to provide and finance health care is
basic to their sovereignty and derives from their general police
power.45  Sub-state jurisdictions have this authority by virtue of
delegation from their states.459 State and local discretion in impos-
ing and collecting taxes is extremely broad.460 Nevertheless, state
and local taxation for the purpose of financing health care reform
453. Cheevers, supra note 446, at Al.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Industrial Conmm'n v. Navajo
County, 167 P.2d 113 (Ariz. 1946); Jerauld County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 71
N.W.2d 571 (S.D. 1955).
459. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. See generally FRANK P. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
MANUAL (1973).
460. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994).
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may not be structured in such a manner as to constitute regulation
of a field preemted by federal law. Moreover, in order for a state
or local tax levied on a business conducting interstate commerce to
be valid, there must exist a "substantial nexus" between the taxed
entity and the state or locality imposing the tax.461 Beyond these
general guidelines, five funding sources exist: general revenue
funds, provider taxes, payroll taxes, health insurance taxes, and
"'sin" taxes.
General Revenue Funds
Legally, states and localities are free to appropriate general
funds to pay for health care reform. However, both states and lo-
calities are already operating under extremely tight budget con-
straints and any effort to increase health care coverage will almost
certainly require additional revenue or spending cuts in other ar-
eas. Popular resistance to increased income and property taxes
suggests that taxes targeted at providers, employers and insurers,
as well as certain "sin" taxes are more feasible alternatives.
Provider Taxes
Several states have considered or attempted imposing a revenue
tax on health care providers to fund state subsidized insurance and
other health reform efforts. Such taxes shift the cost of health re-
form to private insurance plans that health care providers.
One such proposal would assess a "patient" or "bed" tax on hos-
pitals.462 Hospitals providing financial support to community clin-
ics or running their own clinics 463 would be allowed to deduct such
costs from their tax liability.464 Such a system of taxation and de-
duction would encourage hospitals to participate in community-
based health reform. The burden of the tax on hospitals would be
offset in several ways. First, to the extent that subsidized insurance
would increase the number of paying patients, hospitals would ben-
efit. Second, the deduction system would relieve pressure on hos-
pital emergency rooms by encouraging the development of primary
care clinics.4 65 The overwhelming burden of providing primary
care in expensive emergency rooms currently strangles the budgets
461. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992).
462. Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency
Room, 46 STAN. L.REv. 449, 488 (1994).
463. See supra notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
464. Olson, supra note 462, at 489.
465. See supra notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
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of many hospitals, especially those in poor and underserved areas.
Increased development of community clinics would help such hos-
pitals by reducing the amount of expensive, uncompensated pri-
mary care they currently provide and by allowing them to dedicate
resources to more profitable practices.466
The MinnesotaCare program represents an additional example
of a provider tax scheme. Minnesota has enacted legislation to ex-
pand publicly-subsidized health coverage for low income, unin-
sured persons. The subsidization is financed in part through the
imposition of several taxes, including a 2% revenue tax on health
care providers. 67 The Minnesota statute grants the state the power
to tax any health care provider that actually does business in-state
or provides out-of-state services to twenty or more Minnesotans in
any year.468 The statutory provisions attempting to reach out-of-
state business have come under attack from scholars and busi-
nesses, however, on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds.469
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,47 ° the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a state tax on the operation of interstate commerce
is preempted by Congress's plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce unless a four-prong test is met. The tax (1) must be ap-
plied to an activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing state;
(2) must be fairly apportioned; (3) must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (4) must be fairly related to the services
provided by the state.471
The "substantial nexus" requirement has been interpreted by the
Court to require something more than the "minimum contact" re-
466. Olson, supra note 462, at 489. See also supra notes 145-156 and accompanying
text.
467. MIrNNr. STAT. § 295.52 (1992). The 2% tax is imposed on hospitals, doctors, and
certain drug providers. The statute also imposes a 1% revenue tax on HMOs and
nonprofit providers. § 256.9352. Additional funding is derived from a tax on ciga-
rettes. §§ 297.02, 297.03.
468. The statute reaches any provider that "regularly solicits business from poten-
tial customers in Minnesota." MINN. STAT. § 295.51(4) (1992). There is a statutory
provision that a hospital or health care provider "is presumed to regularly solicit busi-
ness within Minnesota if it receives gross receipts for patient services ... from 20 or
more patients domiciled in Minnesota in a calendar year." Id.
469. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution has been read to prevent
states from taxing interstate commerce when the nexus between the taxed entity and
the state imposing the tax is not substantial enough to justify the state burden on
interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; see Eric H. Chadwick, Comment,
MinnesotaCare: Workable Financing or Just Wishful Thinking?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 961 (1993).
470. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
471. Id. at 279.
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quired by due process,472 but not necessarily to require physical
presence of the taxed entity within the state.473 Nevertheless, an
entity is presumed not to have "substantial nexus" if its only con-
nection with the taxing state is through the postal system. 474 More-
over, although an entity's activities may have a connection with a
taxing state, any state taxation may be prohibited upon a finding
that the nexus between the two does not justify the burden.475
The MinnesotaCare tax appears to fail the substantial nexus re-
quirement. The mere fact that twenty Minnesota residents leave
the state to receive health care creates neither a substantial nexus
between the health care provider and Minnesota nor justifies taxa-
tion of the service.476 The MinnesotaCare tax also appears to fail
the requirement that the tax be fairly related to the service pro-
vided by the state. Because the health care provider receives little
or no benefit from Minnesota, the tax is not fairly related to any
state-provided services.7. In light of the potential constitutional
challenge to MinnesotaCare's tax on out-of-state providers, state
taxation schemes must be drafted carefully to avoid such chal-
lenges, and states must consider carefully the role of out-of-state
providers on health care reform within their borders.
State provider taxes are also vulnerable to challenges insofar as
the taxes are found to "relate to" an ERISA plan by passing along
the costs of reform to such plans. 78 The MinnesotaCare provider
tax was upheld by a federal district court against an ERISA chal-
lenge.479 The court reasoned that the tax did not "relate to" ER-
ISA plans because the tax did not: (1) negate plan provisions; (2)
have a significant effect on ERISA entities; (3) affect the adminis-
tration of ERISA plans; or (4) have any but a tenuous economic
impact on ERISA plans.4 80 However, other courts have held that
472. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-17 (1992).
473. Id. at 314.
474. Id. at 315.
475. Id. at 313.
476. Chadwick, supra note 469, at 983.
477. Id. at 986.
478. § 1144(a) of ERISA declares that ERISA shall supersede any and all state
laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
For a more detailed discussion of ERISA and its potential preemption of state health
care reform efforts, see infra notes 522-533 and accompanying text.
479. Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Minn. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d 1093 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Boyle v. Smith, 116 S.Ct.1266 (1996).
480. Id. at 1313-17.
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provider taxes are in fact preempted by ERISA 81 Consequently,
state efforts to tax health care providers must be carefully crafted
to avoid ERISA challenges.
Payroll Taxes
Another potential source of funding for local health care reform
is an employer payroll tax. A general payroll tax on all employers
within a state would fall within the state's taxing powers and would
not be preempted by ERISA. However, such a tax would erode
employer incentives to insure by imposing equal burdens on em-
ployers who do provide health benefits and those who do not.
Commentators have, therefore, proposed allowing employers to
deduct their contributions to employee benefit plans from their tax
liability.482 Seemingly, such a system of taxation and deduction
could circumvent ERISA challenges. The tax in this instance
would be imposed on employers themselves, not the benefit plans.
Moreover, because it would apply to insured and self-insured plans
alike, the scheme would not impermissibly burden ERISA plans.
Health Insurance Taxes
Until recently, attempts to assess taxes on health insurance plans
were susceptible to challenges insofar as the taxes were found to
"relate to"an ERISA plans. However, in New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state surcharge on bills of patients
whose commercial insurance coverage was purchased by employee
health plans governed by ERISA 83 The Court concluded that
such provisions did not "relate to" employee benefit plans within
the meaning of ERISA and therefore suffered no preemption. 48
"Sin" Taxes
Targeted user taxes on products such as cigarettes and alcohol
serve as another potential source of funding. For instance, Min-
481. See James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal
Health Care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in For-
mulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 423 (1994).
482. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medi-
cally Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 908 (1986).
483. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
484. Id.
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nesotaCare is partially financed by a cigarette tax.485 "The political
price to be paid for passage of such taxes is slight in most jurisdic-
tions ... and the correlation between tobacco and alcohol con-
sumption and ill health serves as a compelling argument for using
this source as a funding tool. '486 In addition, state revenue derived
from legalized gambling may also serve as a potential source of
funding.
Public-Private Funding Options
As discussed later in this article, ERISA preempts state attempts
to mandate benefits and requires employers provide health insur-
ance to their employees, insofar as such efforts apply to self-in-
sured plans.487 Prior to the enactment of ERISA, however, Hawaii
had sought to achieve universal coverage through an employer
mandate. 88 Congress, therefore, exempted Hawaii from the reach
of ERISA.4 89 Because Hawaii was the only state that had adopted
the employer mandate prior to the enactment of ERISA, it is un-
likely that Congress will extend the waiver to any other state. As
any change to the original state statute requires Congressional ac-
tion, Hawaii's flexibility in administering and altering its program
has been hampered significantly.4 90 To date, Hawaii has not been
successful in securing permission to make changes to its pro-
gram.4 91 Despite a lack of encouragement from the Hawaii exam-
ple, states are gambling that Congress will allow them to
experiment with employer mandates. At least three states have en-
acted such legislation, and another six are contemplating such
measures.
492
Other states have opted to circumvent the ERISA obstacle by
enacting individual coverage mandates. Minnesota, for example,
485. The Minnesota Health Right Act, 1992 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 549, art. 9,
§ 17 (West).
486. Paul Anders Ogren, Health Care Reform in the States: Where Do We Go From
Here?, STATE HEALTH CARE REFORM, June 1994, at 8.
487. See infra notes 522-533 and accompanying text.
488. Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 393 (1993).
489. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (1994) (exempting HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to
393-51).
490. INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, HEALTH CARE REFORM: 50
STATE PROFILES (July 1994) [hereinafter 50 STATE PROFILES].
491. Id.
492. INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, MAJOR HEALTH LEGISLA-
TION IN THE STATES: 1994 at 23-24 (January 1995). Hawaii, Iowa and Minnesota have
enacted mandates. HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-1 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.21
(West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256 (West 1996).
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enacted an individual mandate effective July, 1997, subject to the
state's securing financing to subsidize premiums for low-income
persons.49 Absent a mandate, states could encourage increased
voluntary coverage through similar subsidization programs. To
control costs, states should carefully tailor eligibility requirements
for such subsidization to target those individuals who are unlikely
to self-insure, without attracting otherwise insurable individuals.
Cost Containment Schemes: Global Budgeting
Global budgeting involves setting overall targets or caps on ex-
penditures over a defined period.494 Several states have enacted or
are studying some form of global budgeting to control health care
costs. 495 For example, Washington, Minnesota, and Vermont incor-
porate statewide expenditure caps into their reform plans as a
means of controlling health care inflation. Washington caps premi-
ums, Minnesota uses a mix of premium caps and global limits, and
Vermont specifies global budget by sector.496 The principles of
global budgeting are particularly attractive in the context of com-
munity-based reform efforts. For example, Professor Shortell's
HPARs would establish an overall area-wide health care budget
based on community rating of the entire population.497 Within the
framework of this budget, the HPARs would contract with health
plans.498 As an incentive to control costs, health plans that oper-
ated within their defined budgets would be allowed to keep a sig-
nificant percentage of the savings.4 99
Legal Issues Affecting Community-Based Reform Efforts
The reform of health care delivery and finance at the local level
will necessarily involve new forms of partnerships between health
care providers, state and local governments, and insurers, thereby
raising a complicated thicket of legal issues. The formation of inte-
grated delivery systems raises antitrust considerations and there-
fore should be structured in conjunction with legislative efforts
designed to protect such joint ventures from federal antitrust liabil-
ity. In addition, ERISA poses a considerable challenge to any
493. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256 (West 1996).
494. 50 STATE PROFILES, supra note 490, at 15.
495. Id.
496. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.04 (West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9406 (1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.800 (West 1995).
497. Shortell, supra note 356, at 119.
498. Id. at 112.
499. Id.
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state-based effort at reform. Specifically, federal law may preempt
state reforms affecting employment-based welfare benefits, and ob-
taining federal ERISA waivers for such reforms may be infeasible.
Moreover, relationships between health care providers must be
structured around complicated federal fraud and abuse laws and
state corporate practice of medicine rules. Further, the structure of
primary care initiatives may have tax implications for charitable or-
ganizations. Finally, states attempting to reform their Medicaid
programs may face barriers in the form of the federal Medicaid
waiver process.
Antitrust Issues
Federal antitrust laws affecting the formation of health care de-
livery systems include: sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,5 °° sec-
tion 17 of the Clayton Act,50 1 and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act.50 2
The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act is most relevant to the development of inte-
grated health care delivery systems. Section one of the Sherman
Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade.50 3 Courts have interpreted section 1 to prohibit only "un-
reasonable" restraints of trade and have employed one of two stan-
dards of unreasonableness: per se unreasonable practices and the
"rule of reason" test.
Certain practices are deemed per se unreasonable, including
price fixing, market division, concerted refusals to deal, and tying
arrangements. 504 Exceptions to the per se unreasonable standard
include joint ventures and the "new product doctrine." Under the
joint venture exception, physicians who "would otherwise be com-
petitors" are considered a "joint venture" if their integration pro-
vides for risk-sharing. 50 5 Physician groups that contract on a
capitated bases5 6 share risk and would therefore be considered
500. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
501. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
502. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1994).
503. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
504. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958).
505. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982).
506. Under a capitation contract, physicians receive a per capita payment that is
independent of the number of services provided to the patient or the costs incurred by
the physician in furnishing those services. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING AND HEALTH INSURANCE: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS (1988).
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joint ventures. Groups that operate on a fee-for service basis, how-
ever, are susceptible to claims of price-fixing and other per se un-
reasonable practices. 50 7 Furthermore, under the "new product
doctrine" exception, integration that produces otherwise unobtain-
able benefits, such as a socially desirable product or a decrease in
costs is not per se unreasonable. 8
If an agreement is not per se unreasonable, courts apply the
"rule of reason" standard to determine whether it unlawfully re-
strains trade. Under this standard, courts define the relevant geo-
graphic and product markets, weigh the anticompetitive effects and
procompetitive efficiencies of the agreement within that market,
and evaluate any collateral agreements to determine whether the
agreement is reasonable. 509
State and local reform efforts may escape Sherman Act scrutiny
in two ways: the state action doctrine, and the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Under the state action doctrine, a state health care re-
form initiative is exempt from Sherman Act antitrust liability if it
passes the two-part test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal.510 The first prong
of the Midcal test requires the state to explicitly consider the anti-
competitive consequences of the legislation.5 11 The legislative his-
tory must specifically refer to and acknowledge that certain anti-
competitive activity will occur under the legislative scheme being
considered.512 The second prong requires states to participate ac-
tively in oversight of the trade restraint. 13 The state may be re-
quired to conduct ongoing review and to retain ultimate decision-
making authority over private interests.5 14 If the anticompetitive
restraint passes muster under the Midcal test, even the conduct of
private parties acting pursuant to the state action is immune from
antitrust liability. 5 5
507. See Carl Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organiza-
tional Models, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 273, 277 (1994).
508. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984). But see Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351 (finding that a PPO product was not
unique).
509. DOJ and FTC Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care
Area, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1631, at S-3 to S-5 (Sept. 16, 1993).
510. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
511. Id. at 105.
512. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
513. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
514. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 624.
515. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
56 (1985).
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Absent a clearly articulated state policy indicating an intention
to replace competition with regulation, this same immunity has not
been extended to subdivisions of state governments, such as coun-
ties and other municipalities. 16 Local governments are, however,
immune from damage suits under the federal antitrust laws by vir-
tue of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.517 To secure
antitrust immunity, therefore, health reform initiatives must meet
either the Midcal test (for states) or the Hallie test (for local enti-
ties), or fall within the purview of the Local Government Antitrust
Act. 518 Alternatively, a state or locality seeking to avoid an anti-
trust challenge to its health care reform plan could seek out a spe-
cial congressional exemption from federal antitrust laws for
anticompetitive activities arising under its reform effort.519
To create antitrust shelter through the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, the American Hospital Association has successfully dis-
seminated a model certificate of public advantage program that
protects certain types of joint action from federal antitrust scrutiny
under the Sherman Act. 2° Similarly, fifteen states have enacted
cooperative agreements acts or certificate of public advantage pro-
grams, which provide oversight and certification agreements in or-
der to create antitrust shelter through the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 2'
ERISA Issues
Generally considered to be the greatest hurdle to state or lo-
cally-based health care reform, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)522 effectively prohibits states and localities
from regulating self-insured health plans. Specifically, ERISA reg-
ulates pension and welfare benefit plans, and exempts all such em-
ployee benefit plans, including health plans, from state or local
regulation.
516. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40-47 (1985). The Hallie
Court also held that the second prong of the Midcal test was inapplicable to munici-
palities. Id. at 46.
517. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994).
518. Robert D. Ray & Brian Lester Smith, Selected Legal Issues Affecting a State's
Movement Towards Health Care Reform, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 711, 727 (1993).
519. Id. at 730 n.98.
520. Kala Ladenheim, State Oversight of Accountable Health Plans: Prospects and
Limits, 7 THE HEALTH LAWYER 15 (Winter 1994-95).
521. Id. at 18.
522. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994).
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ERISA Preemption Doctrine
Employee welfare and pension benefits are subject to federal
regulation under ERISA. Welfare benefits are defined to include
health care benefits provided through the purchase of insurance or
self-insurance by an employer. 3 Under the ERISA preemption
clause, state or local public sector action that "relates to" any em-
ployee benefit plan is preempted by ERISA.5 214 However, if the
plan chooses to purchase insurance, it becomes subject to state and
local regulation of the business of insurance and is saved from pre-
emption under ERISA's "savings clause. ' 525 Self-insured plans are
not covered by the savings clause, and state and local action affect-
ing such plans is preempted by ERISA's "Deemer Clause. ' 52 6 It is
estimated that more than half of all employees with private health
insurance are enrolled in self-insured plans. 27
Preemption Analysis
In determining whether a state or local law is preempted by ER-
ISA, the analysis first considers whether the law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan. The preemption clause has been inter-
preted broadly by the courts to cover any state or local action that
is consistent with the substantive requirements of ERISA 28
Next, the analysis focuses whether the state action regulates the
"business of insurance" and is therefore saved from preemption.
According to the McCarran-Ferguson Act test, the "business of in-
surance" is a practice that (1) has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) is an integral part of the policy
relationship between insurer and insured; and (3) is limited to enti-
tles within the insurance industry. 9
The final issue is whether the Deemer Clause applies. The
Deemer Clause is broadly interpreted by the courts. Specifically,
"if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it."530
523. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
524. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
525. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
526. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
527. See Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of
Health Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 174 (1993).
528. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (failed attempt
to limit reach of preemption clause).
529. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 725-33 (state law requiring mental
health benefits "saved" from preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act test).
530. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64 (1990).
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Implications for State and Local Reform Efforts
State or local laws mandating coverage, mandating certain types
of benefits, requiring coverage for certain providers, or regulating
providers may be in conflict with ERISA.531 Such laws will be up-
held as applied to insurance policies, but not as applied to self-
funded plans. Thus, an integrated health care delivery system may,
for instance, be unable to recover payment from self-insured plans
for mandated benefits.
Commentators have suggested that self-funded plans should not
be able to take advantage of the Deemer Clause to circumvent the
provisions of state and local health care reform efforts.532 They ar-
gue that this should be limited, however, to situations in which
there is clear and convincing evidence that the law was enacted to
further the goals of the state's or locality's reform program and not
merely to benefit certain interests.533
Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Laws
The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits knowing solicita-
tion or offer of payment in return for a referral for services covered
by Medicaid or Medicare. 534 The Federal Self-Referral Statute
prohibits physician referrals of Medicaid patients to entities fur-
nishing designated services in which the physician has a financial
interest.535
The original purpose of these statutes was to prevent over-utili-
zation and to contain Medicaid and Medicare costs. 536 The laws
were designed, however, to address the problems of a fragmented
health care industry and now contradict the current theories of
health care reform by complicating and frustrating the integration
of physicians into organized delivery systems. Enforcement of
these two laws has intensified despite their fading relevanceto cur-
rent reimbursement strategies. 37
531. See supra notes 478-484 and accompanying text.
532. Ray & Smith, supra note 518, at 727.
533. Id.
534. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
535. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994).
536. Amy L. Woodhall, Integrated Delivery Systems: Reforming the Conflicts
Among Federal Referral, Tax Exemption, and Antitrust Laws, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 181,
213 (1995) (discussing the congressional intent of the anti-kickback and self-referral
statutes).
537. Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Expanded Enforcement of the Fraud and Abuse Laws,
23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 1 (1990).
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The Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral' laws are interpreted
broadly by courts, 38 and are criticized for failing to recognize the
nature of managed care and provider economic risk sharing. 539 In
response to such criticism, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services has promulgated safe-harbor regulations and more have
been proposed. Existing safe harbors include qualified investments
in small entities, sales of physician practices, employment relation-
ships, personal service and management contracts, and managed
care organizations.540 Proposed safe-harbor regulations would cre-
ate a distinction between the substance and the form of health care
transactions and prevent "sham transactions" from obtaining shel-
ter under the safe harbors.541
The complexity of the Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral statutes
and the lack of guidance as to legal arrangements have a chilling
effect on the integration of health care providers into organized
delivery systems. Any financial relationship between a hospital
and a physician group which may refer patients to the hospital, or
vice versa, leaves the parties vulnerable to federal fraud and abuse
charges.
It has been argued, however, that hospitals should be permitted
to lend financial support to physician groups for "legitimate busi-
ness reasons unrelated to referrals, including the promotion of
cost-effective managed care. ' 542 In fact, many hospitals have cho-
sen to assume the risk, and thus far these activities have been
unprosecuted.5 43
538. See, e.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc. 874
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding the convictions of a hospital employee and the pres-
ident of an ambulance company for receiving and providing automobiles and other
compensation in return for recommending a hospital contract for ambulance com-
pany services); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the
conviction of a physician for receiving a 50% kickback for referral of blood and urine
samples to a laboratory).
539. See Hitchner et. al., supra note 507, at 277.
540. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202 (1994) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed July 21, 1994); 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (1993) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed Sept. 21, 1993).
541. See 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203, 37,208 (1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.954) (proposed July 21, 1994). The proposed rule states "[a]ny transaction or
other device entered into or employed for the purpose of appearing to fit within a safe
harbor when the substance of the transaction or device is not accurately reflected by
the form will be disregarded, and whether the arrangement receives the protection of
a safe harbor will be determined by the substance of the transaction or device." Id. at
37,208.
542. Hitchner et al., supra note 507, at 279.
543. Id.
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Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Some states prohibit the "corporate practice of medicine 544
Under this doctrine, only licensed professionals may practice
medicine, and therefore neither lay persons nor organizations, in-
cluding hospitals, may hire physicians or control the professional
aspects of their practices.545 Only other physicians or professional
corporations or associations may employ physicians. 46
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine may therefore cre-
ate a barrier to the establishment of alliances between hospitals
and physicians designed to integrate efficiently primary care deliv-
ery and to control costs. Recognizing the fading relevance of the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine in light of modem health
care concerns, many states with such laws on the books have cho-
sen not to enforce them.547
Because alliances between hospitals and physician groups may
be an essential component of community- based health care re-
form, any reform effort should include a revision of corporate prac-
tice of medicine laws, either by the individual states or by federal
preemption of the field.
Federal Tax-Exemption
Charitable nonprofit organizations are exempt from federal in-
come tax. 548 To be eligible for tax-exemption, the organization
must organize and operate exclusively for an exempt, charitable
purpose.549 The two-part test relating to this exclusivity require-
ment has an organization prong and operational prong.
Under the organization prong, the entity's charter must be lim-
ited to one or more exempt purposes and cannot empower the en-
tity to engage, otherwise than as an unsubstantial part of its
activities, in nonexempt activities and its assets must be dedicated
to an exempt purpose. Under the operational prong, the entity
must primarily engage in activities directed toward the accomplish-
544. In some states, the prohibition is statutory. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 311.375, 311.376, 313.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-
11-3, 16-11-4, 58-12-30 (1993). In others, the prohibition is found only in case law.
See, e.g., Kerner v. United Medical Sources, 200 N.E. 157 (Ill. 1936) (lay corporation's
operation of low cost clinic violated corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
545. Hitchner et al., supra note 507, at 276.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
549. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
550. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b) (as amended in 1990).
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ment of its exempt purpose. If more than an unsubstantial part of
its activities is not so directed, or if net earnings inure to private
individuals, the organization fails the operational.5
Although the IRS, which enforces the tax laws, has been some-
what supportive of integrated delivery system development, it has
nonetheless been criticized for its application of hospital-oriented
standards to new modes of delivery, for restraining physician prac-
tices, and, more generally, for establishing health care policy and
enforcing health care laws.5
The creation of integrated delivery systems at the local level
poses potential conflict with tax-exemption laws. Specifically,
while promoting health has long been recognized as a charitable
purpose and has given may hospitals tax-exempt status, if an ex-
empt hospital's net earnings inure to the benefit of physicians, or if
the hospital's operations are deemed to benefit physicians more
than incidentally, the hospital's exempt status may be jeopard-
ized.553 However, according to the IRS, a joint venture between a
hospital and physicians, may be viewed as enhancing the hospital's
charitable activity, rather than diminishing it, to the extent that it
creates a new service or "product" in the community served and
did not result in more than an incidental private benefit to the
physiciafis 54
Medicaid Waiver Process
States have the opportunity to obtain an administrative waiver
from the federal government to experiment with different ap-
proaches to financing and delivering health care. 5  The source of
authority for state-based Medicaid demonstration projects is sec-
tion 1115 of the Social Security Act.556 Section 1115 authority was
designed to permit states to conduct short term experimental pol-
icy projects. 57 The demonstration waiver serves as an important
551. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990).
552. Woodhall, supra note 536, at 199.
553. Hitchner et al., supra note 507, at 282.
554. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
555. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 873 (1990).
556. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994). This waiver authority is the general demonstration
provision of the Social Security Act. The waiver provision was enacted as part of the
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 192 (1962), and
made applicable to Medicaid when it was enacted in 1965.
557. See Elizabeth Anderson, Administering Health Care: Lessons From the Health
Care Financing Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & PoL. 215, 224 (Win-
ter 1994).
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tool, however, as the states increasingly seek to effect broad, long-
term reforms in health care.
The legislative history and subsequent interpretation of section
1115 both indicate that the provision was not intended to allow the
states to reform as they saw fit, but rather to allow the federal gov-
ernment to orchestrate a federal research agenda aimed at improv-
ing health policy.55 8 In its early stages, the waiver review process
took into account neither the effect of proposed projects on Medi-
caid recipients, nor program costs. 559
More recently, however, concerns for program beneficiaries and
costs have grown and further complicated the review process. 6 °
States are now required to prepare comprehensive analyses of the
proposed program's budget neutrality. 6' In addition, proposed
state programs are now subject to several layers of federal review
in a process that often takes more than two years. The complexity
of the current review process has chilled demonstration efforts sig-
nificantly.5 62 The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 created two
additional sources of waiver authority. Under a freedom of choice
waiver, a state may waive the otherwise applicable right of benefi-
ciaries to free choice of providers. 63 Under a home and commu-
nity-based services waiver, a state may provide a wide range of
services not otherwise available under its Medicaid plan, targeted
exclusively to individuals who are institutionalized or at risk of in-
stitutionalization.5 64 Both the freedom of choice waiver and the
home and community-based service waiver are intended to facili-
tate more permanent policy or program changes.5 65
Although the process for obtaining these programmatic waivers
is relatively simple and clearly defined, states raise a legitimate
complaint about the time period for which they are approved.
Freedom of choice waivers last for only two years, while home and
community-based service waivers last for only three years.566 As a
result, states are burdened with renewal applications every few
years.
558. Id. at 225.
559. Id. at 226.
560. Id. at 227.
561. Id. at 224.
562. Id. at 226-27.
563. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994).
564. Id.
565. Anderson, supra note 557, at 233.
566. Id. at 236.
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Conclusion
This article has considered how a decentralized, community-
based approach to health care reform can address our nation's cur-
rent health care crisis. A "bottom-up" approach would enable lo-
calities to see what works best in providing the noninsured and the
underinsured with preventive and primary health care in an effi-
cient, effective manner. It would also facilitate the decentralization
of the American political economy and encourage participation in
local institutions.

